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ABSTRACT
In order to credibly "sell" legitimate children to their spouse, women must
forego more attractive mating opportunities. This paper derives the implica-
tions of this observation for the pattern of matching in marriage markets, the
dynamics of human capital accumulation, and the evolution of the gene pool.
A key consequence of the trade-off faced by women is that marriage markets
will naturally tend to be hypergamous — that is, a marriage is more likely
to occur, the greater the man’s human capital, and the lower the woman’s
human capital. As a consequence, it is shown that the equilibrium can only
be of two types. In the "Victorian" type, all agents marry somebody of the
same rank in the distribution of income. In the "Sex and the City" (SATC)
type, women marry men who are better ranked than themselves. There is a
mass of unmarried men at the bottom of the distribution of human capital,
and a mass of single women at the top of that distribution. It is shown that
the economy switches from a Victorian to an SATC equilibrium as inequality
goes up.
The model sheds light on how marriage affects the returns to human
capital for men and women. Absent marriage, these returns are larger for
women than for men but the opposite may occur if marriage prevails. Finally,
it is shown that the institution of marriage may or may not favour human
capital accumulation depending on how genes affect one’s productivity at
accumulating human capital.
Keywords: Marriage markets, human capital accumulation, hypergamy,
overlapping generations, legitimacy
JEL classification: D1, D13, D3, E24, I2, J12, J13, J16, K36, O15, O43,
1
1 Introduction
This paper studies an economic model of marriage which is entirely based on
the biological differences between men and women. The two most important
differences are that, in nature, women know for sure whom their children
are, while men don’t; and that men can potentially have children with a
large number of women, while women can’t.1
Because of the first of these biological differences, there are gains from
trade between men and women. Women can sell to men a guarantee that
her children are his—a property I call legitimacy. Men are willing to pay
for legitimacy because they can raise their utility by investing in their own
children. This will hold provided men derive utility from quantity and quality
of children2. This is true by assumption in this paper’s model—in fact both
men and women derive the same utility from consumption and children.
However, to provide such a guarantee, the woman must credibly commit
to mate only with her husband. This implies that some long-term contract
must be signed between a woman and a man, and that this contract must
put penalities on female adultery — hence, the traditional marriage contract.3
Furthermore, the second biological difference between men and women im-
plies that women have an opportunity cost of marrying. Instead of marrying,
they could mate with men with the most desirable characteristics, and im-
prove the genotype of their offsprings. Because these men’s gametes are not
1There is a deep link between these two differences: female gametes are scarce because
women provide the investment in natural resources to turn an embryo into a baby. This
feature implies that they cannot produce a very large number of children and that they
know for sure that they are theirs. The opposite is true for men.
2Although in the model higher human capital for the offspring does not enhance its
survival probability, this is likely to be so in reality, which accounts why people value their
children’s human capital as a proxy for their own inclusive fitness.
3The model developed below aims at understanding marriage for most of human history;
but in the last few decades contraception, IVF, (selective) abortion, and DNA testing
have appeared. Clealry, these features decouple sexual intercourse from legitimacy. A new
marriage contract may evolve. See Edlund (2005) for a thorough discussion.
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scarce, they have no cost of mating with as many women as possible, and they
benefit from it to the extent that they derive utility from having illegitimate
children.4 By marrying, a woman foregoes the superior genetic material of
the most attractive men5; on the other hand she benefits from the father’s
investment in the children’s human capital and from increased consumption
due to the public good aspect of children’s human capital and from any im-
plicit transfer from her husband. This trade-off will hold as long as men
have different observable traits that are genetically heritable and valued by
the parents in their children. In the model, it is assumed that children of
more desirable men (the alpha men) are more productive in acquiring human
capital.
This paper derives the implications of these observations for the pattern
of matching in marriage markets, the dynamics of human capital accumula-
tion, and the evolution of the gene pool. A key consequence of the trade-off
faced by women is that marriage markets will naturally tend to be hyperg-
amous — that is, a marriage is more likely to occur, the greater the man’s
human capital, and the lower the woman’s human capital. The reason is
that the utility loss from marrying a beta man instead of an alpha man is
not transferable; therefore, the greater a woman’s human capital, the lower
her marginal utility of consumption, and the larger the transfer that she
must get from a man in order to be compensated for her foregone mating
opportunities. The opposite logic is at work for men: the larger their human
capital, the lower their marginal utility of consumption, and the greater their
willingness to pay for legitimate children.
At the end of this Introduction we discuss this paper’s relationship to
the existing literature. Then in Section 2 the model is set up, and we derive
4In the model, this is true; parents derive the same utility from their legitimate and
illegitimate children. Because the latter are not known to the father, though, they cannot
invest in their human capital, and, for this reason, do prefer to marry and have legitimate
children.
5Unless she happens to marry a man with the highest genetic quality (an alpha in
this paper’s model), in which case marriage entails no opportunity cost to the woman.
Nor would the alpha man have an opportunity cost under the double standard discussed
further below in the paper.
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the equilibrium conditions for a "state of nature" where marriage does not
exist, and for a society where marriage exists. We use a model of the in-
tergenerational transmission of human capital with sexual reproduction, en-
dogenous mating and household formation, and heritable genetic differences
between people (alphas vs betas). People derive utility from consumption,
and the quantity and quality of their children. Their income is proportional
to their human capital, which depends on their genes and on their parent’s
investment. They allocate their income between their consumption and their
children’s human capital accumulation. A key result is that in the State of
Nature, only the alpha men mate; the beta men are driven out of the market
as they cannot credibly buy legitimacy from women. We then derive a condi-
tion for marriage to yield a positive surplus relative to each party remaining
single is derived. This condition exhibits hypergamy: it is more likely to hold,
the greater the man’s human capital, and the smaller the woman’s human
capital.
Section 3 derives and discusses the model’s prediction for the mating
pattern. We characterize the equilibrium assignment of husbands to wife,
and perform comparative statics with respect to this assignment. A perfectly
competitive marriage market is assumed. It is shown that perfect assortative
matching arises and that this is due to the public good aspect of the children
in the woman’s and the man’s utility function. Because of the hypergamy
effect, we can also show that the equilibrium can only be of two types. In
the "Victorian" type, all agents marry somebody of the same rank in the
distribution of income. In the model households produce the same number
of boys and girls of each genetic type and provide the same investment in
human capital to both; therefore, the distribution of human capital is the
same for men and for women. In such a "Victorian" equilibrium, therefore,
people marry somebody with exactly their human capital (homogamy). In
the "Sex and the City" (SATC) type, women marry men who have more
human capital than themselves. There is a mass of unmarried men at the
bottom of the distribution of human capital, and a mass of single women at
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the top of that distribution. It is shown that the economy switches from a
Victorian to an SATC equilibrium as inequality goes up; one interpretation
is that less skilled women underbid more skilled ones for their husbands,
which in equilibrium drives the skilled woman’s share in bargaining down.
As a result, the most skilled women end up better-off unmarried, and mating
with alpha men. The same mechanism explains why the equilibrium may be
SATC even though all homogamous marriages would be viable: starting from
a homogamous assignment, less skilled women would successfully underbid
more skilled ones by accepting a lower share of the surplus, thus driving
them out of the marriage market. This suggests that perfect competition
in marriage markets may reduce the number of marriages relative to other
institutional arrangements for matching husbands and wives together.6
The model sheds light on how marriage affects the returns to human cap-
ital for men and women. In the State of Nature, these returns are larger for
women than for men because they use their human capital both to invest in
their children and to increase their own consumption. When marriage exists,
this effect is equalized between men and women, but additional interesting
effects arise. The returns to human capital depend on how the surplus is
split between men and women at different levels of human capital: when
inequality is large,competition for mates from low-skill women generates a
downward profile of the woman’s share in output as her human capital goes
up.This tends to reduce the returns to human capital for women relative to
men. Another effect arises if the equilibrium is SATC: a man has a lower
quality spouse than a woman with the same level of human capital; there-
fore his marginal utility of consumption and his return to human capital are
higher. Finally, in an SATC equilibrium, acquiring human capital may make
a man eligible for marriage, while it may eliminate the benefits of marriage
for a woman. This, too, tends to reduce the return to human capital for
women relative to men. On the other hand, in an SATC equilibrium beta
6For example, in the case just discussed, there will be more marriages if instead of a
competitive market, a social norm allocates a single partner of the same genetic type and
human capital to each individual, thus replicating the Victorian assignment.
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men at the bottom of the distribution of skills are single and therefore have
the same low return to human capital as in the State of Nature. Following
this analysis, we may speculate that the decline of marriage may have some-
thing to do with men losing ground relative to women in higher education,
relative to an initial situation where they did acquire more education than
women7.
A consequence of the trade-off between father’s investment and good
genes is that marriage does not necessarily enhance the quality of children.
It increases parental investment but more children are of the less productive
"beta" type. Whether marriage is beneficial for human capital accumulation
depends on the productivity difference between alpha and beta types, as well
as on the elasticity of a child’s human capital to parental investment. These
aspects are discussed in Section 4. I first study whether a particular marriage
improves the children’s human capital relative to the mother remaining single
and mating with an alpha male. I show that if the productivity difference
between the two types is large, to benefit the children’s human capital a mar-
riage should be even more hypergamous than what is needed for its viability.
These results clearly depend on the alphas being more productive rather than
more sexually attractive instead.8 I then study whether the mating pattern is
desirable from the point of view of the next generation’s human capital level.
In this model, as in many others in the literature, children cannot borrow to
accumulate their own human capital and must stick with what they inherit
from their parents. This creates an intergenerational externality: investment
7The assessment depends on how the decline of marriage is interpreted. As show below,
a transition from a Victorian equilibrium to an SATC holding the distribution of human
capital constant one increases the returns to human capital for married men because they
are mated to women with less human capital than in the Victorian equilibrium. So the
returns to human capital only fall for the men who end up single at the bottom of the
skill distribution. On the other hand, a decline in marriage due to lower enforceability
of monogamy and thus lower prospects for men to have legitimate children will uniformly
move the economy closer to the State of Nature and unambiguously reduce the returns to
human capital for men and increase them for women.
8A variant of the model can be constructed where the alphas are more sexually attrac-
tive but not more productive. The resulst regarding mating patterns would be unchanged
but marriage would then unambiguously be good for human capital accumulation.
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in human capital does not maximize the utility of those in which it is embod-
ied but that of their parents. Potentially, both the mating pattern and the
investment level in human capital are different from the ones which would
maximize the next generation’s human capital. I characterize the assignment
which maximizes the total human capital among children, and show that it
involves negative assortative mating ("the cinderella effect"). This is because
such negative correlation between the wife’s and the husband’s human capi-
tal reduces inequality in household human capital, which is beneficial for the
total human capital of the subsequent generation, due to decreasing returns
in the technology of acquiring human capital. On the other hand, it remains
true that if this allocation is such that there are some singles, these will be
the least skilled men and the most skilled women, as their offspring’s human
capital is higher if they mate with an alpha man than if they get married.
Finally, I move to a general equilibrium dynamic analaysis and study (in the
Victorian case) the long-run distribution of human capital and genes in the
marriage economy and compares it to the state of nature, and derive con-
ditions for average steady state human capital to be larger under marriage
than under the state of nature. Again, this need not always hold and will
not if the productivity difference between the two genotypes is large enough.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
1.1 Relationship to the existing literature
This paper is related to the existing literature on marriage markets and on
how this institution affects human capital accumulation. Overall, this lit-
erature has recognized that women are sellers in marriage markets either
because of the sexual division of labor (Becker (1973, 1974)) or because of
the role played by women in reproduction (Aiyagari et al. (2000), Edlund
(2006)). This paper’s contribution is twofold. First, it brings back the abun-
dance of male gametes and the existence of genetic differences in ability into
the analysis, and accordingly identifies a trade-off for women as providers of
legitimacy. Second, it fully analyses the consequences of that trade-off for
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the mating pattern and the evolution of the distribution of skills and genes.
The model described here fits with the general framework outlined by
Becker (1973, 1974), but there are a number of substantial differences. In
both models, households produce public goods and "own children" are the
most important one (the only one we consider here). But while most of
Becker’s results rely on the sexual division of labor and the complementarities
and substitutability between the tasks performed by husbands and wives,
here, as discussed below, all the results come from the trade-offs between
mate quality and father’s investment that women face.
Another related paper is Aiyagari et al. (2000). As in Aiyagari et al.,
marriage generates an extra benefit to men in the form of utility derived from
the human capital of their children, while women get this benefit regardless
of whether they are married or not. Another common point is the use of
the model to analyze the dynamics of human capital accumulation. A key
difference, though, is that in their paper, marriage entails no per se oppor-
tunity cost for women, as there are no genetic differences in the population.
As a result, hypergamy does not arise; also, they do not analytically solve
for a marriage market equilibrium but instead rely on numerical simulations
in the context of a matching model.9
Other papers that deal with various interactions between marriage mar-
kets and the transmission of human capital include Gould et al. (2004)
and Edlund and Lagerlof (2002). Gould et al. study the trade-off between
9There are many other differences between the two papers. Ayiagari et al. chiefly
focus on marital dissolution and the role of the welfare state. This paper focuses on the
consequences of hypergamy which arises from the women’s trade-off between providing
legitimacy and selecting a mate.
In their paper, contrary to this one, one has to be married to have children; single parents
are divorced. Single fathers do not derive utility from their children’s human capital by
assumption; in the present model, a single divorced father would have incentives to invest
in his children’s human capital. Single men do not have that incentive here because they
either have no children (if they are betas) or do not know their children (if they are alphas).
In Aiyagari et al., women are assumed to have an intrinsic comparative advantage in child
rearing: only the woman’s input increases the child’s human capital. In this model, there
is perfect symmetry between the two sexes; the only asymmetry arises because of the
relative abundance of male gametes which allows female to select the best possible mate
according to their genetic characteristics.
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polygamy and monogamy in a model where richer men can be married to
more than one woman and therefore get more offspring. In their model,
polygyny has adverse effects on aggregate human capital accumulation be-
cause each offspring gets a lower parental investment from the father. This
situation is somewhat intermediate between monogamy and the nonmarriage
state of nature (where the alpha men mate with several women) that are an-
alyzed here. Edlund and Lagerlof (2004) compare "love" marriages where
there is a transfer from husband to wife, to "arranged" marriages where the
transfer goes to the bride’s father. They argue that "love" marriages have
better properties in terms of human and physical capital accumulation; the
mechanism is quite different from the rest of the literature: parents do not
care about their children’s human capital per se but do care about their
marriageability, and thus under "love marriage" want to transfer resources
to their sons to increase their chances of mating.
Relative to this literature, the present paper focuses on the trade-off for
women between providing legitimacy to a man by engaging in a monogamous
marriage versus selecting a mate with more desirable characteristics. Here,
all the differences between men and women are biological and derive from
(i) the greater availability of man gametes and (ii) the impossibility for men
to identify their own children absent an adequate institutional arrangement.
In particular, none of the results rely on specialization and comparative ad-
vantage between the members of the household. Hypergamy arises because
women, as sellers of legitimacy, face an opportunity cost for participating in
marriage markets, regardless of how men and women are specialized in the
production of home goods and market goods. By contrast, in Becker’s model,
a woman’s income reduces her gain from marriage, while a man’s income in-
creases his gain from marriage, if the woman earns less than the man. The
converse would occur should the woman earn more than the man. This is be-
cause household members specialize in tasks according to their comparative
advantage and the gains from trade depend on their productivity difference
regardless of sex. Hence, while Becker’s model predicts that marriage rates
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should stop falling and increase again should women overtake men in rela-
tive economic status, the present model predicts that they will continue to
decline.
Another key aspect of my analysis is that the desirable characteristics
of the alpha men who would be available to women outside marriage are
genetic and are inherited by the offspring. As a result, the model implies
that the institution of marriage has an effect on the evolution of the gene
pool.10 A consequence is that marriage does not necessarily enhance human
capital accumulation. As in Gould et al. and Aiyagari et al., monogamous
marriages increase parental investment by involving fathers into families. But
here it has a downside, since marriage allows beta men to mate in addition to
alpha men, thus increasing the proportion of less productive betas in the next
generation. Consequently, for some parameter values the marriage market
equilibrium has lower aggregate human capital accumulation than absent
marriage.
In this paper, the marriage market equilibrium delivers assortative match-
ing, as in a number of papers in the literature11. But the logic is a bit dif-
ferent. In Becker (1973), foir example, the matching pattern is driven by
complementarity and substitutability between the two members’ contribu-
tions to the household public good. Here these contributions are perfect
substitutes but sorting is affected by the overall economies of scales in a
team’s average human capital, as in Kremer (1993) and Saint-Paul (2001).
The child’s human capital is a public good and generates increasing returns
that lead to positive assortative mating, despite the lack of complementarity
between the man’s and the woman’s input.12
10Becker (1974) discusses the effect of marriage on natural selection from a very different
perspective, focusing on the consequences of assortative mating.
11See for example Fernandez et al. (2001), Burdett and Coles (1997). In these models,
as in Aiyagari et al., the marriage market is frictional. In Fernandez et al. and Aiyagari
et al. people are entitled to two draws, while Burdett and Coles use a matching func-
tion framework. In contrast, here, we follow Becker (1973) and characterize a perfectly
competitive assignment in marriage markets.
12This is in contrast to Becker’s prediction, since his model predicts sorting with respect
to other characteristics but not wages, where the comparative advantage logic prevails.
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2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
At each generation, people are either male or female. They consume, produce
offspring and invest in the human capital of their offspring. Generations are
non-overlapping and people only live one period, as far as their economically
relevant activities are concerned.
Utility. People care about their consumption and their children’s human
capital. I assume the same utility for men and women:
U = ln c+ γ
ncX
i=1
E lnh0i,
where c is consumption, nc the number of children, E the expectations oper-
ator, and h0i the human capital of a child. People only care about the human
capital of their true genetic offspring.
Genotypes. People differ in their genetic endowment. There are two
genotypes: alpha (α) and beta (β). One can make different assumptions
about the role of genes, and they lead to different results. I will assume that
the alphas have better genes in that it is easier for them to accumulate human
capital. People then prefer alpha offsprings because these have a higher level
of human capital for any given level of parental investment. Alternatively,
though, one may assume that alpha people are more sexually attractive:
mating with an alpha yields a utility gain but has no effect on the offspring’s
human capital.13 As long as the analysis is confined to the decision to marry
and the assignment of husbands to wives, the two models are equivalent.
But if mating with an alpha only yields direct utility gains then marriage
13This may be the case, for example, if the genetic advantage of the alphas evolved in a
different environment with hunter-gatherer societies, in which the productivity advantage
of the alphas was hard-wired in the form of greater attractiveness; the alphas would then
have more appealing sexually but not be productive in the current environment. Note that
if one were to assume that people care about their offsprings’s attractiveness, rather than
productivity, one could relabel attractiveness "human capital" and be back to model A
(one would be in the special case where ψ = 0 if parents cannot invest in attractiveness).
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unambiguously boosts the offspring’s human capital, which is not necessarily
true in the model studied below.
Production and human capital accumulation. The production structure
is as follows: an individual with h units of human capital can produce Ah
of output. This output can be used either to consume or to invest in the
children’s human capital. For an isolated individual, therefore, the budget
constraint is c + nz = Ah, where z is the per-child investment in human
capital.14The technology determining the offspring’s human capital is then
given by
h0 = αzψ,
if the child is an alpha, and
h0 = βzψ,
if the child is a beta. We assume that α > β and that 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1. Thus, the
alphas accumulate more human capital, for a given z, than the betas. Given
that people care about their offspring’s human capital, they would prefer to
have alpha offsprings rather than beta offsprings.
For simplicity, I will also assume that people invest in their children’s
human capital before their type is observed.
Mating and children. People have access to unlimited possibilities of
mating. All that is required is that both parties agree to mate. Mating
produces offsprings. For simplicity, let’s assume that each intercourse can
produce one child. A woman (the sex with scarce gametes) can have up to
n children. In contrast, a man (the sex with abundant gametes) will have
as many children as the number of intercourses he has had. We will restrict
the analysis to a zone where the contribution of children to utility is always
positive, so that each woman will indeed have n children. We also assume
that exactly n/2 of them are girls and n/2 are boys.
14I assume that all children get the same investment in human capital, which would be
true in equilibrium given the concavity of utility in h0 and given that the type of the child
is not observed.
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The type of the child (alpha vs. beta) only depends on the type of his or
her father. We assume that alpha fathers sire alpha children in proportion pα,
while beta fathers sire beta children in proportion pβ < pα. That assumption
implies that the mother’s type has no effect on her children’s type, and it
is chiefly made for simplicity. The key mechanism of the model is that all
women can get their offspring from some alpha male, as his gametes are
infinitely abundant. The converse is not true; if alpha women increased
the probability of having an alpha offspring, men would compete to mate
with alpha women rather than beta women; presumably, there would be
an implicit price or transfer that the former would get, but in equilibrium
there would be men who cannot mate with alpha women and would have to
settle with beta women, or not mate at all, instead. That is an interesting
mechanism, which probably bears some relevance, but it is not my focus here.
The key point is that no woman, either alpha or beta, has to settle for a beta
man, because they can access the unscarce gametes of an alpha man instead.
2.2 The State of Nature: No Marriage
I now study the equilibrium in the "State of Nature", where individuals can-
not contract on their mating behavior. I will consider the optimal behavior
of men and women; starred variables refer to men’s choices, and primed
variables to the children.
In the state of nature, marriage does not exist. An important biological
difference between men and women then kicks in: Men do not know who their
offspring are. Consequently, they are not going to invest in the human capital
of children. (More generally, though, they could discount the γnE lnh0 term
in their utility function by the probability that they are the actual father,
which depends on parameters such as the size of the community they live in,
how much of the private life of the women with whom they mated they have
observed, and so on. The key point is that the incentives to invest in children
are quite low compared to a marital society where men identify their own
children with a much higher probability.)
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Because men do not observe who their children are, their consumption
choice is simple: They will just set c∗ = Ah∗ and z∗ = 0. Their resulting
utility is lnh∗+ lnA+ γ
Pn∗
i=1E lnh
0
i, where the latter part is determined by
n∗, the number of intercourses, and {E lnh0i}, the expected human capital of
their children. They do not have any impact on that latter variable, which
is determined by the woman. As for n∗, the man’s utility is increasing with
n∗ if and only if E lnh0i > 0. We will assume that parameter values are such
that in equilibrium the distribution of human capital in the population is
bounded from below: h0 > 1. In such a case, utility is increasing in the
number of children. Consequently, men’s choices are simple: they accept all
sexual intercourse and consume all their human capital endowment.
Since men accept all sexual intercourse, women can select which men
they mate with. Since men do not provide resources to their children, the
man’s human capital is irrelevant to the woman’s choice. Therefore, women
will choose men on the basis of their genetic characteristics only. Since alpha
children get more human capital for the same level of parental investment,
women only mate with alpha men . Thus, n∗ = 0 for beta men , and n∗ = nρ
for alpha men, where ρ is the proportion of alpha men in the population. We
can then rewrite their utility function as
U¯∗β(h
∗) = lnA+ lnh∗ (1)
for beta men , and
U¯∗α(h
∗) = lnA+ lnh∗ + σ∗, (2)
for alpha men , where σ∗ = γnE lnh
0
ρ is the hedonic value of their (unknown)
children.
To allocate resources between consumption and investment in children, a
woman maximizes
ln c+ γn(pα ln(αzψ) + (1− pα) ln(βzψ)),
subject to the budget constraint
c+ nz = Ah.
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Note that, for simplicity, z is the same across children since investment in
children takes place before the child’s genetic type is observed. In particular,
since n/2 of any woman’s children are girls, the distribution of human capital
will be the same, by construction, for men and women.
The solution to that problem is
z =
γψ
1 + γnψ
Ah; (3)
c =
1
1 + γnψ
Ah.
The resulting utility is
U¯α(h) = (1 + γnψ)(lnA+ lnh) + πα, (4)
where πα is a constant representing the total hedonic value of having n alpha
children, which is given by
πα = γn (pα lnα+ (1− pα) lnβ) + γnψ ln(γψ)− (1 + γnψ) ln(1 + γnψ).
Thus, women only mate with alpha men and invest a constant fraction
of their resources into their children.
Note that if the man were beta, expected utility would instead be equal
to
U¯β(h) = (1 + γnψ)(lnA+ lnh) + πβ, (5)
with
πβ = πα − γn(pα − pβ) ln(α/β)
= πα − k,
where
k = γn(pα − pβ) ln(α/β)
is an index of the hedonic value to a woman of mating with an alpha man
compared to a beta man, for a given level of parental investment.
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We will confine the analysis to situations where men and women are
better-off having children on their own, even if the father is beta, rather
than no children at all. That is — since the utility of a childless woman
would also be given by (1) — the values of h are such that U¯β(h) > U¯∗β(h), or
equivalently
h > h1 = A−1e−πβ/(γnψ).
The constant h1 is the lowest level of a woman’s human capital which
makes it worthwhile to mate with a beta man and raise children on her own.
Below that level, the children will inherit such a low level of skills that their
contribution to the woman’s utility will be negative.
2.3 Marriage
I now introduce marriage into the model. Marriage is a contract by which
a woman commits to have intercourse with only one man—her husband. We
are going to look at the individuals’ willingness to sign such a contract, as
opposed to remaining promiscuous and achieveing an outcome similar to the
state of nature described in the previous section.
The value of the marriage contract to a man, is that he knows his children
are his, a property I will call legitimacy. Legitimacy makes it desirable for
the man to increase his investment in the children’s human capital. Both
alpha men and beta men benefit from this. But the beta men benefit more.
While the alpha men benefit from the fact that they know their children, the
beta men benefit from the fact that marriage allows them to have children,
which they cannot achieve in the state of nature.
What is the value of marriage for women? It mostly comes from the fact
that there is a surplus from the match, due to children’s human capital being
a public good to the household. That surplus makes it possible for the man
to transfer income to both his wife and his children, while remaining better-
off than if he were single. That, in turn, makes the wife better-off relative to
being promiscuous. However, the surplus of the match differs considerably
depending on whether the husband is alpha or beta.
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If the husband is alpha, the woman gets the same genetic quality for her
children as if she were promiscuous. If the marriage contract is such that the
alpha man has to be faithful, the man faces a trade-off between remaining
promiscuous and potentially having more offsprings, versus marrying and
having children of his own in whom he can invest. However, from a pure
efficiency viewpoint, it is optimal for the couple to have a double standard by
which the man can be promiscuous outside of the couple, while the woman
cannot. The reason is that male promiscuity has no impact on the woman’s
knowledge that her children are hers. Furthermore, the illegitimate children
are costless to the couple, as only their mothers invest in them. Thus, in this
model, the surplus of the match is maximized if the alpha man is allowed to
be promiscuous. In that section, I will therefore assume that this is the case,
i.e. that the double standard holds15. Under the double standard, then, there
is always a net positive surplus for a woman between a woman and an alpha
male. The alpha man gets the same number of offsprings outside marriage
as he would get should he be single, plus his legitimate children in whom he
can invest. The woman gets the same genetic material as if she were single,
plus the man’s willingness to provide for his legitimate children.
If the husband is beta, the woman gets the man’s willingness to provide
for the children. But she gets a lower genetic material than if she were single
and promiscuous, in which case she would have children with alpha men
instead of a beta male. She needs to be compensated for that loss by the
man transfering enough resources to her. As we shall see, that is possible
only if the man has enough human capital both in the absolute and relative
to the woman. Thus a marriage between a woman and a beta man yields a
positive net surplus only if the man’s human capital is high enough and if
the woman’s human capital is low enough.16
15The existence of a double standard in the treatment of adultery is widely documented
throughout cultures. For example, Holmes (1995) shows that "The Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes Act of 1857 included a double standard in its provisions. While a wife’s
adultery was sufficient cause to end a marriage, a woman could divorce her husband only
if his adultery had been compounded by another matrimonial offence."
16Note that the double standard is not binding in that case since no promiscuous woman
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Let us now get into the analytics of this reasoning. We assume that when
a man and a woman meet each other, they efficiently decide on whether to
marry or not, and allocate consumption and investment in children efficiently
within the household. The allocation will therefore maximize some weighted
average of the two members’ utilities:17
max θ(ln c+ γnE lnh0) + (1− θ)(ln c∗ + γnE lnh0 + σ∗),
where again σ∗ is the value to the man of children outside marriage18.
The budget constraint for the couple is now
c+ c∗ + nz ≤ A(h+ h∗).
It can be seen that the optimal level of investment in children is
z =
γψ
1 + γnψ
A(h+ h∗), (6)
which, conveniently, does not depend on θ. The optimal allocation of con-
sumption is then
c =
θ
1 + γnψ
A(h+ h∗);
c∗ =
1− θ
1 + γnψ
A(h+ h∗).
The resulting utilities can be readily computed from the preceding deriva-
tions. Asuming a beta man, for the woman, we get
Uβ(h, h∗, θ) = ln θ + (1 + γnψ) (lnA+ ln(h+ h∗)) + πβ, (7)
while the man’s utility is given by
U∗β(h, h
∗, θ) = ln(1− θ) + (1 + γnψ) (lnA+ ln(h+ h∗)) + πβ. (8)
wants to have intercourse with a beta male.
17The relevant weights θ and 1 − θ depend on the bargaining game played by the two
parties, and on their outside option. The determination of θ is discussed in section 3.5.1.
18That is, for beta males, σ∗ = 0, and for alpha males, σ∗ = γn¯(1−m)E lnh
0
ρ , where m
is the equilibrium proportion of married women. Thus, the value of σ∗ that applies in a
marital world is different from that in the State of Nature.
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The same formulae hold for a beta man, with πβ replaced with πα.
Let us now analyze when marriage is beneficial relative to being single.
A marriage is efficient provided there exists some θ such that each party can
get a utility greater than their outside option. Let us briefly consider the
case where the man is alpha. His utility outside marriage is given by U¯∗α(h∗)
in (2). Outside marriage, his wife would get a utility U¯α(h) as given by (4).
Inside marriage, since the children have the same distribution of genotypes
as if the woman were single and mating with alpha men , that utility can be
replicated by setting c∗ = Ah∗, c = 1
1+γnψAh and z =
γψ
1+γnψAh. The couple
can then improve on that by picking the optimal, higher level of human
capital given by (6), and choosing the same consumption ratio between the
two parties. Consequently, a match with an alpha man is always efficient, as
long as the double standard allows the alpha man to remain promiscuous.
Now consider the case of a beta man. The woman’s utility outside mar-
riage is U¯α(h). Her utility inside marriage is Uβ(h, h∗, θ). Confronting (7) with
(4), we see that for the woman to gain from marriage she must at least get
a share θmin of consumption, where
θmin = ek
µ
1 +
h∗
h
¶−(1+γnψ)
.
The match is efficient if the man’s utility U∗β(h, h
∗, θ), computed at θ =
θmin, is greater than the man’s outside option, which is given by lnA+lnh∗.
That defines the condition under which the marriage takes place:
1− θmin ≥ hγnψ1 h∗(h+ h∗)−(1+γnψ).
Substituting the value of θmin, we get themarriage viability condition:
(h+ h∗)1+γnψ ≥ hγnψ1 h∗ + ekh1+γnψ. (9)
This inequality defines the set of values of (h, h∗) such that the match
between a woman with human capital h and a beta man with human capital
h∗ is viable.
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Figure 1 depicts that set in the (h∗, h) plane. We see that for any value
of h, there exists a minimum value of h∗ such that the match is viable.
Furthermore, that value is increasing with h. Therefore, there is hypergamy
in that the match is more viable, the more skilled the man relative to the
woman.
A woman with zero human capital is marriageable because an arbitrarily
small consumption level is enough to compensate her for the opportunity cost
of not mating with an alpha male, while her husband gets a finite benefit
from legitimacy. As her human capital goes up, the consumption equivalent
of foregone mating opportunities with alpha men goes up, and only men with
a high enough level of human capital are willing to transfer that amount to
her in exchange for legitimacy.
As Figure 1 shows, the marriageability frontier — the maximum human
capital that the woman must have to marry a man with h∗ — converges from
below to an asymptote, defined by
h∗ = h(ek/(1+γnψ) − 1) (10)
, when h∗ becomes large. That suggests that hypergamy is more stringent at
low levels of human capital, in that the maximum h/h∗ ratio goes up with
h∗.19 This is because, due to the contribution of children to parent’s utility,
married men’s utility is more elastic to their human capital than single men’s
utility. Therefore, men with large levels of human capital are willing to
transfer virtually all their wealth in exchange for legitimate children, given
their low marginal utility of consumption; poorer men are not willing to
pay as much for legitimacy, which reduces the relative human capital of the
women who are willing to settle with them.
19According to (9), mathematically, that maximum, given by x, is the largest root of
(1 + x)1+γn¯π − ekx1+γn¯ψ = (h1/h∗)1+γn¯ψ.
That indeed defines a positive relationship between h∗ and x.
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3 Who marries whom ? Marriage markets
I now turn to the next question which is: who is going to marry whom? There
are several alternative modelling choices that one may make. For example,
one may assume that people meet once randomly and decide whether to
marry or stay single. Or, the meeting may not be random and imply some
correlation between the human capital and genetic endowment of the two
mates. One can also consider more complex search decisions where mates
can be turned down in the hope of a better mate. Here I assume that there
is a perfect marriage market such that in the resulting assignment, it would
not be profitable for an individual to outbid a mate from another couple. For
simplicity, I am going to assume that alpha individuals and beta individuals
cannot marry each other: there is a separate marriage market for each type.
It is still possible, however for alpha and beta individuals to mate sexually
and produce offsprings. Thus any single beta woman can get offsprings from
an alpha man and the preceding analysis applies. In what follows, we focus
on marriage patterns among the betas, and will return to the alphas later for
the sake of completeness. All the analysis is performed for one generation
only, taking as given their initial distribution of human capital, denoted by
f(). The joint determination of f() and the marriage market equilibrium will
be discussed further in section 4.3.
3.1 Defining an equilibrium
The following definition clarifies the candidate equilibria. Note that it rules
out equilibria where some individuals get married and other identical ones
do not, except over a set of measure zero.
DEFINITION 1 — Let f() be the distribution of human capital among the
beta individuals, which is assumed to be the same between men and women.
Let [hmin, hmax] be the support of f(). An assignment is
(i) A pair of sets S, S∗ ⊆ [hmin, hmax]
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(ii) A mapping20 h∗() from S to S∗
such that for any measurable set Σ ⊆ SZ
Σ
f(h)dh =
Z
h∗(Σ)
f(h∗)dh∗. (11)
The sets S, S∗ tell us the set of women and men, respectively, who are
married. The mapping h∗() tells us whom marries whom. Condition (11)
ensures that each woman marries exactly one man, so that for any set of
women Σ the measure of the set of their husbands is equal to the measure of
Σ.
20If h∗() is continuous, then to be a mapping it must be monotonic. But we do not
actually require that it be continuous, so other configurations are possible. Note though
that it is not the most general formulation, as it implies that each woman type marries
exactly one man type, and vice versa. A more general formulation would introduce a
measure of marriages over [hmin, hmax]2.
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DEFINITION 2 — An assignment (S, S∗, h∗()) is in equilibrium if there
exists a function θ : S → [0, 1] such that:
(i) ∀h ∈ S,
Uβ(h, h∗(h), θ(h)) ≥ U¯α(h) (12)
(ii) ∀h ∈ S,
U∗β(h, h
∗(h), θ(h)) ≥ U¯∗β(h∗(h)) (13)
(iii) Let V ∗(h∗) = U¯∗β(h
∗) if h∗ /∈ S∗ and V ∗(h∗) = U∗β(h∗−1(h∗), h∗, θ(h∗−1(h∗)))
if h∗ ∈ S∗.Let V (h) = U¯α(h) if h /∈ S and V (h) = Uβ(h, h∗(h), θ(h)) if
h ∈ S.
For any h, h∗ ∈ [hmin, hmax], let θˆ(h, h∗) be such that Uβ(h, h∗, θˆ
∗
(h, h∗)) =
V (h). Then the following must be true:
∀h, h∗ ∈ [hmin, hmax], U∗β(h, h∗, θˆ(h, h∗)) ≤ V ∗(h∗). (14)
This definition spells out the three conditions for the equilibrium assign-
ment to be better than any deviation. Condition (i) states that married
women get a higher utility than if they were single. Condition (ii) states
that married men get a higher utility than if they were single. Condition
(iii) that no couple can be formed so that one party gets at least his/her
reservation utility and the other gets strictly more than his/her reservation
utility.2122
3.2 Properties of an equilibrium
We now turn to analyzing the properties of the equilibrium assignment. A
natural question to be asked is: will there be sorting? Intuitively, individuals
21For any h, h∗ ∈ [hmin, hmax] let θˆ
∗
(h, h∗) be such that U∗β(h, h
∗, θˆ
∗
(h, h∗)) = V ∗(h∗).
Then (14) is equivalent to:
∀h, h∗ ∈ [hmin, hmax], Uβ(h, h∗, θˆ
∗
(h, h∗)) ≤ V (h).
To see this, just note that both conditions are equivalent to θˆ
∗
(h, h∗) ≤ θˆ(h, h∗).
22Note that this condition (14) holds with equality if the couple we consider is indeed
married in equilibrium. Indeed, we can check that for h∗ = h∗(h), θˆ(h, h∗) = θˆ
∗
(h, h∗) =
θ(h).
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with more human capital may be willing to pay more to get a higher quality
mate. This is actually true here:
PROPOSITION 1 — Any equilibrium assignment function h∗(h) must be
nondecreasing.
PROOF — See Appendix.
This result comes from the public good aspect of children’s human capital
in the household. Absent children, people would be indifferent about whom
they mate with and in equilibrium they would share resources within the
household so as to replicate the singles’ allocation of consumption. Marriage
would then be a constant returns technology. Since, in addition to that,
it provides benefits in the form of the children’s human capital, it is an
increasing returns technology: when the average human capital of a couple
doubles, its output, in consumption-equivalent terms, more than doubles;
not only can the consumption of each member double, but the quality of
the children also goes up. For this reason, people with high human capital
are willing to pay more to increase their spouse’s human capital than people
with low human capital; the usual sorting conditions hold.
In what follows, we will be able to elicit two types of equilibria, which we
now define precisely.
DEFINITION 3 — An assignment is "Victorian" if S = S∗ = [hmin, hmax].
DEFINITION 4 — An assignment has the "Sex and the City" (SATC)
property if there exists h¯ < hmax and h∗ > hmin such that S = [hmin, h¯] and
S∗ = [h∗, hmax].
A Victorian assignment is an assignment where everybody marries. Be-
cause h() is nondecreasing, women must then marry men with the same rank
in the distribution of income. Given that men and women have the same
initial distribution of human capital, a Victorian assignment is homogamous,
i.e. h∗(h) = h.23
23Formally, denote by μ() the measure associated with f() and by F () the c.d.f. Then
all people marry. For property (11) to hold, it must be that μ([hmin, h]) = μ([hmin, h∗(h)])
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A "Sex and the City" assignment is such that any single woman has more
human capital than any married woman, while the reverse holds for men.
Because h() is monotonous, an SATC assignment is hypergamous. Women
must marry men who have a higher rank than them in the distribution of
income: h∗(h) ≥ h.24
If the assumption that men and women have the same distribution of
human capital were relaxed, then these properties would still hold in terms
of how the spouses are ranked in their own sex’s distribution of human capital.
The following proposition shows that Victorian and SATC are the only
two possible equilibrium types, provided F () has full support.
PROPOSITION 2 — Assume F () has full support. Then the equilibrium
assignment must be either Victorian or SATC.
PROOF — See Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that in any equilibrium, the singles must be found at
the top of the skilled distribution for women and at the bottom for the men.
The mechanism behind this result is complex, as the reader can check by
reading the proof. A first property is that if a man is better-off married than
single, then all men with greater skills could also be better-off than single
by marrying his wife and give her her reservation utility, which is associated
with a smaller share of the now larger surplus than what she got with her
original husband. This implies that S∗ = [h∗, hmax] for some h∗. Another,
less obvious, property is that there cannot be "holes" in S, i.e. S must be an
interval: single women who are richer than some married women and poorer
than some other married ones can successfully underbid one of these two.
Finally, the poorest married woman (h) must marry the poorest married
man (h∗). But if both of them are richer than hmin, competition from poorer
since, by monotonicity (Proposition 1), h∗() maps [hmin, h] into [hmin, h∗(h)]. That is
equivalent to F (h) = F (h∗(h)) for all h, i.e. h∗(h) = h. Similarly, in an SATC equilibrium,
we must have F (h) = F (h∗(h))− F (h∗), so that h∗(h) > h.
24If the distribution of human capital has full support and no mass point, this inequality
holds strictly; if it is not degenerate in a single mass point, it holds strictly for some h.
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single men and women must drive the surplus of their match to zero—leaving
them just as well off as if they were single. But this is not sufficient since
a marriage between h∗ and h < h would then generate a strictly positive
surplus and therefore successfully break the original marriage. Therefore,
there cannot be any single woman poorer than the poorest married one.
3.3 Existence of Victorian equilibria
Having established results regarding how any equilibrium looks like, we are
now able to construct equilibria. In this section, I provide an existence result
for Victorian equilibria. It should be noted that all homogamous marriages
are viable, relative to both parties being single, if (9), which is more likely
to hold at h = h∗ the greater their common value, holds for h = h∗ = hmin,
or equivalently
21+γnψ ≥ hγnψ1 h
−γnψ
min + e
k. (15)
One might speculate that if (15) holds, then the equilibrium is always
Victorian, since all people are better-off in homogamous marriages than being
single. However, that is not true: the condition for a Victorian equilibrium
to exist is actually stronger than (15).
PROPOSITION 3 — Assume the following inequality holds:
h1+γnψmax ≤
2γnψh1+γnψmin − h
γnψ
1 hmin
ek − 2γnψ , (16)
then there exists a Victorian equilibrium assignment such that
(i) S = S∗ = [hmin, hmax]
(ii) h∗(h) = h
(iii) θ(h) = 1
2
¡
1 + λh−(1+γnψ)
¢
, where λ is any number such that
max(
¡
2−γnψek − 1
¢
h1+γnψmax ,
¡
2−γnψek − 1
¢
h1+γnψmin ) (17)
≤ λ ≤
³
1− 2−γnψhγnψ1 h
−γnψ
min
´
h1+γnψmin
PROOF— See Appendix
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If (16) holds, then so does (15), but the converse is not true. Therefore,
there are situations were homogamous mating would improve over being
single for all people, yet we cannot construct it as an equilibrium. In fact
we can show that (16) is not only sufficient, but necessary, for a Victorian
equilibrium to exist:
PROPOSITION 4 — Assume (16) is violated. Then no Victorian equi-
librium exists.
PROOF — See Appendix
3.4 Existence of a "Sex and the City" equilibrium
If (16) is violated, can we construct an SATC equilibrium? While I cannot
prove existence of a marriage market equilibrium for any set of parameters
(and I conjecture that for some parameters existence will fail), one can con-
struct an SATC equilibrium if (16) is not violated by too much. This is what
the next proposition says:
PROPOSITION 5 — Assume there exists B > 0 such that if
2γnψh1+γnψmin − h
γnψ
1 hmin
ek − 2γnψ < h
1+γnψ
max ≤
2γnψh1+γnψmin − h
γnψ
1 hmin
ek − 2γnψ +B, (18)
then
(i) An SATC equilibrium exists such that S = [hmin, h¯] and S∗ = [h∗, hmax]
(ii) In this equilibrium, the assignment function is
h∗(h) = F−1(F (h) + F (h∗)), (19)
implying h∗(hmin) =h∗. Furthermore, h¯ = F−1(1−F (h∗)),implying h∗(h¯) =
hmax.
(iii) The married woman’s share in bargaining satisfies
θ(h) = (h+ h∗(h))−(1+γnψ)
∙
(1 + γnψ)
Z h
hmin
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz + μ
¸
, (20)
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where μ is a constant.
(iv) The equilibrium is locally unique
PROOF — See Appendix
Thus, singleness arises at the top of the skill distribution for women, and
at the bottom for men, as an outcome of competition in marriage markets25.
This, despite that the sex ratio is 1:1 and that (15) may hold26, i.e. that all
homogamous marriages would be preferred to being single.27
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 How is output being shared?
In both the SATC and the Victorian equilibrium, θ() satisfies the following
differential equation:
θ0(h) =
1 + γnψ
h+ h∗(h)
µ
1− θ(h)
θ(h)
− h∗0(h)
¶
. (21)
This equation is a first-order condition that tells us that locally, women
with an arbitrarily close level of human capital cannot profitably underbid
a married woman to get her husband (a similar condition for men leads to
the same mathematical expression). The second term in parentheses, h∗0(h),
tells us that the larger the husband’s human capital relative to the husbands
of marginally less skilled woman, the lower the share of output that this
woman can get, due to competition from these women. The first term tells
us that the larger a woman’s output share, the smaller (more negative) θ0(h).
This is because the greater her output share, the greater the incentives for
marginally less skilled women to underbid her; for them to be deterred from
doing that, their own output share must be higher, hence θ0(h)must be lower.
25If (15) holds, any single woman could improve her lot by marrying a single man, pro-
vided he has at least as much human capital as she has. Therefore, any SATC equilbrium
will be such that all single women have more human capital than all single men.
26In fact (15) always holds under the conditions of Proposition 5, since (16) is only
violated marginally and it is stronger than (15).
27This stands in contrast to Edlund’s (2005) analysis of the "Sex and the City phenom-
enon".
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While the sharing profile is determined in an SATC equilibrium, a Vic-
torian one is compatible with a continuum of alternative sharing profiles,
parametrized by the value of λ. If ek ≤ 2γnψ, one may have θ(h) > 1/2 or
θ(h) < 1/2. If ek > 2γnψ , women necessarily get more than half the surplus.
The reason for this indeterminacy is that there are no singles. All couples
are strictly better-off than if they were single, and a person’s outside option
in bargaining is determined by what he or she would get in another marriage.
Therefore, the equilibrium assignment can be unchanged if one reallocates
consumption between men and women while leaving these relative trade-
offs unchanged. Things are different in the SATC equilibrium where the
sharing schedule must satisfy boundary conditions such that the most skilled
married woman and the least skilled married man are indifferent between
being married and single. An overall shift in the allocation of consumption
which would leave the incentives for married people to underbid one another
unaffected would violate these boundary conditions, so that the assignment
could not be preserved.
3.5.2 The role of inequality
A key property of (16) is that it is more likely to be satisfied, the greater hmin
and the lower hmax. Therefore, greater inequality, as defined by a larger hmax
and/or a lower hmin makes it more likely that the equilibrium, if any, be of the
SATC type. In other words, inequality destroys the Victorian equilibrium
and therefore has an averse effect on the number of marriages.
Let us try to provide some intuition for this result. The mechanism
at work is an unraveling of marriage market competition throughout the
distribution of income. If ek ≤ 2γnψ, (16) always holds and the Victorian
equilibrium always exists, regardless of hmin and hmax. If ek > 2γnψ, then
Proposition 4 implies that λ > 0, so that (i) women get more than 50 %
of the marriage’s total consumption, and (ii) this share is lower, the greater
the woman’s human capital. Women get a large share of the surplus because
k is large, implying that the value of the lost genetic material from mating
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with a beta man instead of an alpha man is large. But this large share of
the surplus has an effect on competition between married beta people: as
implied by (21), the woman’s output share must be more steeply decreasing
with h. Hence, if ek > 2γnψ, competition tends to reduce the share of high-
skill women and to increase that of low-skill women. But, if there is too much
inequality, this process will be defeated by the exit options of low-skill men
who will be better-off single than transferring a large share of the surplus
to their wives. And similarly, high-skill women will get too low a share of
the surplus for them to get appropriate compensation for mating with a beta
man. This destroys the Victorian equilibrium and triggers a transition to an
SATC equilibrium.
3.5.3 The returns to human capital
While the model has no role for the returns to human capital, since people
cannot change the level of h inherited from their parents, it is instructive to
compute them among alternative arrangements. This is what we do below,
comparing the marginal utility of human capital for men and women at a
given level of human capital in the different situations we have analyzed.
State of Nature In the state of nature, women have a greater return on
human capital than men:
dU¯∗β(h
∗)
dh∗
=
dU¯∗α(h∗)
dh∗
=
1
h∗
;
dU¯(h)
dh
=
1 + γnψ
h
.
This is because women invest their resources in both consumption and
children, while men spend all on consumption. This suggest that if there
were scope for accumulating human capital beyond what is inherited from
parents, then in the state of nature women would acquire more human capital
than men.
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Victorian equilibrium Let us now compute the rate of return to h in the
Victorian equilibrium. For beta women, it is equal to
dU¯β
dh
=
θ0(h)
θ(h)
+
1 + γnψ
h
=
(1 + γnψ)
h+ λh−γnψ
Similarly, for men we get
dU¯∗β
dh∗
=
−θ0(h)
1− θ(h) +
1 + γnψ
h
=
(1 + γnψ)
h− λh−γnψ .
If λ > 0, i.e. θ(h) > 1/2, then men have a greater return to human capital
than women. This is because by acquiring more human capital they end up
marrying a woman with a smaller equilibrium share of output. The converse
occurs for women. If λ < 0, i.e. if k is not too large, then the reverse holds:
women have a greater return to human capital because in equilibrium their
husband’s output share falls as they climb the social ladder.
SATC equilibrium The analysis is richer in the case of an SATC equi-
librium. For married women, the returns to human capital come from three
components:
• The effect of their own human capital on the quality of their mate,
which is equal to
∂Uβ
∂h∗
h∗0(h) =
(1 + γnψ)h∗0(h)
h+ h∗(h)
.
The larger h∗0(h), the greater the increase in the husband’s human
capital when the wife’s human capital goes up by one unit. Since
h∗0(h) = f(h)f(h∗) by virtue of (19), this effect is stronger, the scarcer men
are relative to women locally.
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• The effect of their human capital on their output share, given by
∂Uβ
∂θ
θ0(h) =
θ0(h)
θ(h)
.
The return to human capital is greater, the greater the increment in
the woman’s output share when she climbs the social ladder. As im-
plied by (21), this effect can be further decomposed into the effect of
husband’s incremental human capital and the effect of marriage com-
petition. Straightforward computations show that the former exactly
cancels the ∂Uβ∂h∗ h
∗0(h) term, so that h∗0(h) disappears from the final
formula.
• Finally, there is a direct effect due to the decreasing marginal utility of
human capital; this effect is equal to
∂Uβ
∂h
=
1 + nγψ
h+ h∗(h)
Similar effects hold for men. Putting all these effects together, we get the
net return to human capital for women:
V 0(h) =
1 + nγψ
θ(h)(h+ h∗(h))
.
For men, the corresponding formula is
V ∗0(h∗) =
1 + nγψ
(1− θ(h∗−1(h∗))(h∗ + h∗−1(h∗)) .
One effect tends to generate greater return to human capital for men
than for women with the same skills: the former’s mate has less skills than
the latter’s; because of hypergamy, total household human capital is smaller
for men than for women with the same skills, hence the greater returns
to skills for the former. This effect was not present in the homogamous
Victorian equilibrium. The other effect is that of θ, which is the same as in
the Victorian equilibrium. If θ() > 1/2 then women will have a lower return
to human capital because of the net effect of marriage competition. While we
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do not know in general whether this inequality holds, it does for the equilibria
constructed in Proposition 5, because they are close to the limit Victorian
equilibrium such that (16) holds exactly, and we know from Proposition 3
that λ > 0, i.e. θ() > 1/2, for these equilibria.
3.6 Comparative statics with respect to the assign-
ment
In this section, I provide further results on the comparative statics of the
SATC assignment constructed in Proposition 5. The following result can be
proved:
Proposition 6 — Under the conditions of Proposition 5, the following com-
parative statics result hold:
(i) dh
∗
dk > 0;
dμ
dk > 0
(ii) dh
∗
dh1
> 0; dμdh1 < 0
(iii) For a uniform distribution F (), dh
∗
dhmax
> 0, dμdhmax > 0 and the propor-
tion of married people falls with hmax.
PROOF—See Appendix.
This result tells us that the proportion of married people will fall, and
the equilibrium gap in human capital between husbands and wives rise,
-if k goes up, that is the opportunity cost of mating with a beta instead
of an alpha goes up. This is natural, as an increase in k raises the outside
option of celibacy for the most skilled women. For the same reason, women
get a higher share of output, i.e. μ goes up.
-if h1 goes up, holding other parameters constant. The parameter h1 is
inversely related to the hedonic value of having children with a beta father,
relative to not having children. The greater h1, the lower the value of children.
When h1 goes up, the least skilled married men find themselves better-off
being single, as their willingness to pay for children is lower. This will be the
case if A falls, since the marginal utility of consumption then goes up and
makes it less valuable for men to give up income in exchange of legitimate
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children28. As a result, too, the women’s share falls.
-if there is an increase in inequality due to a higher maximum level of
human capital, in the case of a uniform distribution. Greater inequality
reduces the proportion of women below h¯, but increases the proportion of
men above h∗. This creates an imbalance in the marriage market, which leads
to an increase in the women’s share of output as well as an increase in h∗.
The total effect on the number of marriages is negative.
4 The effect of marriage on the transmission
of human capital.
In this section I discuss the effect of the institution of marriage on the accu-
mulation of human capital and the economy’s growth path. I first analyze
this question at the level of an individual couple: does marriage increase
the human capital of their children relative to what they would get should
their mother remain single. I then ask whether the equilibrium assignment
is desirable from the point of view of the next generation’s human capital.
Finally, I provide some results regarding the effect of marriage on aggregate
human capital accumulation.
4.1 Partial equilibrium analysis
One key aspect of marriage is that two parents, rather than one, now invest
in the children’s human capital. In the state of nature, parental investment
is equal to z = γψ
1+γnψAh; in the matrimonial society, it is equal to z =
γψ
1+γnψA(h+h
∗). Because the child’s human capital is a public good to his/her
parents, establishing a link between fathers and their children works like a free
lunch and makes all parties better-off. By introducing father’s investment,
one may increase the wife’s consumption level while not reducing investment
in the children.
28The other exogenous parameters that enter the definition of h1 also appear elsewhere
in the equilibrium equations. A is the only parameter which acts through h1 only.
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The free lunch occurs, however, only if we ignore that absent marriage the
woman would have mated with an alpha male. For a couple where the man
is alpha, that is unconsequential, and the children always get more human
capital than if their mother remained single. Straightforward computations
show that average offspring human capital is given by, in this case:
E lnh0Mα = ψ(lnA+ ln(h+ h
∗)) + pα lnα+ (1− pα) lnβ (22)
+ψ ln(γψ)− ψ ln(1 + γnψ),
while absent marriage it would be equal to
E lnh0S = ψ(lnA+ lnh) + pα lnα+ (1− pα) lnβ
+ψ ln(γψ)− ψ ln(1 + γnψ).
For the couple where the man is beta, however, expected human capital
is smaller than if the husband where alpha:
E lnh0Mβ = ψ(lnA+ ln(h+ h
∗)) + pβ lnα+ (1− pβ) lnβ
+ψ ln(γψ)− ψ ln(1 + γnψ)
= E lnh0Mα −
k
γn
. (23)
We get that E lnh0Mβ ≥ E lnh0S if and only if
h∗ ≥ h(ek/(γnψ) − 1). (24)
That condition is not necessarily weaker than (9). In fact, it defines
a lower h/h∗ ratio than the asymptote (10). That means that there are
marriages that take place despite that they yield a lower human capital to
the children than if the woman mated with an alpha man instead. The
additional investment in children is not enough to compensate for the poorer
genetic material. In such a situation, for the children to have more human
capital in expectations, the husband should have even more human capital
relative to the wife. Figure 2 illustrates this point by partitioning the plane
in three zones: a zone where marriage does not take place, a zone where
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it takes place but children have lower quality than if their mother had not
married and mated with an alpha man instead, and a zone where children
have a higher quality than under that option.
Some marriages take place despite creating children of poorer average
quality, because the mother gets a higher consumption level due to the "free
lunch" aspect of legitimacy discussed above (while the father still gets the
direct benefit of legitimacy). Marriage not only boosts investment in children
but have consumption benefits as well.
An agent that would allocate marriages on the sole basis of children’s
human capital would implement a higher level of hypergamy than the party
themselves. If, for example, the bride’s parents can determine whom she mar-
ries, and if they care about their own consumption and about their grandchil-
dren’s quality, rather than their daughter’s consumption, then they will reject
applicants that their daughter would be happy to accept. This has been the
theme of much popular literature, as exemplified by plays by Shakespeare,
Molière, Goldoni, and others—although the model says nothing about why
in these plays, the daughter wants to reject the richer applicants that their
parents have chosen.
To summarize: While marriage always boosts investment in children, it
does not necessarily boost their human capital, because of the implied reduc-
tion in the father’s genetic quality. Human capital goes up if the marriage is
sufficiently hypergamous or if the father is alpha. But it would always go up
under the alternative assumption that alpha men are only more attractive
and have no effect on the children’s productivity.
4.2 More results on the intergenerational externality
By construction, the assignment studied in the preceding two sections is
Pareto-optimal in that no alternative assignment allows to improve the util-
ity of all agents in the generation of the parents. But the children have no
say in the determination of their human capital, which is an intergenerational
externality: parents value their own consumption in addition to their chil-
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dren’s human capital, and typically choose a different investment level from
what their children would do if they had access to perfect capital markets.
This section studies the implications of that externality by performing two
exercises. First, it asks how the results would be changed if children had
access to financial markets that would allow them to choose their own level
of human capital. We show that the results relative to the parent’s assign-
ments are qualitatively unchanged. Second, we ask how a "planner" who
wants to maximize the total human capital of the children would choose the
set of marriages. Such a planner will sometimes want all agents to marry,
and sometimes want men with low human capital and women with high hu-
man capital to remain single. This is qualitatively similar to the equilibrium
outcome. But whereas the equilibrium assignment has positive assortative
mating, the planner’s has negative assortative mating. We show that this
"Cinderella effect" is due to decreasing returns in the production of human
capital.
4.2.1 The role of incomplete markets
An important aspect of the model is that the market for human capital
is incomplete. Individuals cannot borrow in order to purchase their own
optimal investment in human capital z. Instead, they must inherit the level
of investment decided by their parents.
What would happen if a market for human capital investment existed?
To simplify, let us assume that people can also get insured against the risk
of being a beta. Then people will choose their own z by maximizing
max
Eh0
1 + r
− z = (pβα+ (1− pβ)β)z
ψ
1 + r
− z,
where r is the relevant interest rate and the individual is assumed to have
a beta father. The key point is that this optimization programme yields a
constant value of h0. All individuals with beta fathers will acquire the same
level of human capital, denoted by h¯β, regardless of their parent’s human
capital. Similarly, children of alpha fathers will all have the same human
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capital h¯α > h¯β.
How would this affect marriage markets? Clearly, as long as parents care
about the human capital of their children, any parental investment would
be inframarginal and not affect the child’s optimal human capital. Hence,
parents will no longer invest in their children’s human capital. The utility of
a woman married with a beta man is
ln θ + ln(A(h+ h∗)) + γn ln h¯β;
her husband gets a utility equal to
ln(1− θ) + ln(A(h+ h∗)) + γn ln h¯β.
A single beta man would get a utility equal to ln(Ah), while a single
woman would get a utility equal to ln(Ah) + γn ln h¯α.
We see from these formulae that the analysis is the same as above in the
special case where ψ = 0.29 The only novelty is that Proposition 1 no longer
holds, because the sorting condition is satisfied with equality, so there may
exist equilibria with a non-increasing assignment function. But we can still
construct homogamous and SATC equilibria by applying propositions 4 and
6 with the required substitutions.
As in Galor and Zeira (1993), the lack of complete markets imply that
children of poor households in equilibrium, have a higher marginal product
of human capital than children of rich households. Consequently, inequality
tends to reduce the total level of human capital among offsprings. This ex-
plains why a central planner who would maximize aggregate offspring human
capital and could only affect the mating pattern would run against assorta-
tive matching and instead match high human capital women with low human
capital men, and vice-versa (the Cinderella effect).
29The constants must also be redefined: πβ and πα are replaced by γn ln h¯β and γn ln h¯α,
and k by γn(ln h¯α − ln h¯β).
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4.2.2 Comparing the marriage market equilibrium assignment with
the output maximizing assignment: the Cinderella effect.
I now give formal content to this claim. Let us consider how a central planner
would allocate husbands to wives among beta agents if he were maximizing
the total human capital of offsprings. I will call the resulting assignment the
"output-maximizing" solution.
First of all, a choice must be made about how human capital is aggregated
among agents. A natural choice is to add it in logarithms, since it enters the
utility function in logarithms and log human capital levels can easily be
aggregated. But this builds a bias in favor of reducing the inequality in the
distribution. Let us be more agnostic and maximize total human capital in
levels.
Second, we must define the instruments available to the central planner. I
will assume that he controls only the assignment function, and not the level
of parental investment of each household, which is still determined by (8)
and (3). I also assume (for simplicty and ease of comparison with the equi-
librium) that the central planner cannot violate the "taboo" which prevents
intermarriages between alphas and betas.
Equations (6) and (3) tells us that parental investment is proportional
to the total human capital of the (legal) parents, with the same coefficient
for single mothers and married couples. Therefore, the central planner max-
imizes
max
h∗()
Z
S
(pβα+ (1− pβ)β)(h+ h∗(h))ψf(h)dh
+
Z
[hmin,hmax]−S
(pαα+ (1− pα)β)hψf(h)dh,
and must pick the set of married women S and the assignment function
h∗(h). The latter must be compatible with the supply of husbands, implying
that the following constraint must be matched:
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∀S∗ ⊆ S,
Z
S∗
f(h∗)dh∗ ≥
Z
h∗−1(S∗)
f(h)dh.
PROPOSITION 7 — The output maximizing solution must be such that
(i) All single women have more human capital than all married women
(ii) All single men have less human capital than all married men
(iii) The assignment function h∗(h) is decreasing with h.
PROOF — See Appendix.
The reason why the output maximizing central planner prefers negative
assortative mating is that there are decreasing returns to parental investment,
and that in the absence of complete markets negative assortative mating
allows to even the distribution of total parental human capital, which yields
greater total output.
If some people remain single, then it must be the poorest men and the
richest women. Clearly, if a married man were poorer than a single one,
a swap between the two would increase parental investment in the offspring
while having no effect on his or her genotype. Total output would then clearly
go up. The property that single women are better skilled thanmarried women
comes from the fact that the output gain from marrying any given man is
a decreasing function of the woman’s human capital. This is due to two
facts. First, there are decreasing returns to parental investment. Second,
the output loss from getting beta children instead of alpha ones is larger, the
larger total parental investment, i.e. the larger the mother’s human capital.
Proposition 7 implies that the output maximizing solution can only be in
three regimes, the next proposition characterizes these regimes.
PROPOSITION 8 — Let
κ =
pαα+ (1− pα)β
pβα+ (1− pβ)β
> 1.
Let η(h) = F−1(1− F (h))
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(i) If µ
1 +
hmin
hmax
¶ψ
≥ κ,
then the output maximizing solution is such that all agents get married; the
corresponding assignment function is h∗(h) = η(h).
(ii) If
µ
1 +
hmin
hmax
¶ψ
≤ κ ≤
µ
1 +
hmax
hmin
¶ψ
,
then the output maximizing solution is such that women are married for
h < h¯ and men are married for h∗ > η(h¯), where h¯ is the unique solution to
µ
1 +
η(h¯)
h¯
¶ψ
= κ.
The assignment function is h∗(h) = η(h).
(iii) If µ
1 +
hmax
hmin
¶ψ
≤ κ,
then the output maximizing solution is that nobody marries among the
betas.
PROOF — See Appendix
This proposition is summarized in Figure 3 and tells us the following. For
any level of inequality, as measured by hmaxhmin , the central planner’s optimum
can be in one of three regimes, depending on the productivity advantage of
the alphas, as measured by κ. If it is large, then it is best to leave everybody
single (No Marriage, NM). If it is small, then it is best to match each indi-
vidual with his/her opposite in the other sex’s distribution of income (The
Cinderella-Victorian outcome, CV). Finally, for intermediate values of κ, the
central planner wants the most skilled men to marry the least skilled women,
again in a negative assortative matching fashion (The Cinderella-SATC out-
come, CSATC). Furthermore, this regime is more likely, i.e. prevails for a
wider range of values of κ, the greater the inequality. This makes sense since
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greater inequality makes it more likely that a marriage between the most
skilled man and the least skilled woman improves their offspring’s human
capital relative to them remaining single, while the converse is true for a
marriage between the most skilled woman and the least skilled man.
4.3 The effect of marriage on aggregate human capital
accumulation in the long-run
I now study the effect of marriage on human capital accumulation in the
economy as a whole, comparing human capital accumulation in the State
of Nature with a marital economy in a Victorian equilibrium (computing
aggregate capital accumulation in an SATC equilibrium proved analytically
untractable).
4.3.1 Aggregate human capital accumulation in the State of Na-
ture
A first step is to characterize aggregate human capital accumulation in the
State of Nature.This is easy, provided average human capital is defined in
logarithms. We get from (3):
E lnh0 = pα lnα+ (1− pα) lnβ + ψE ln z
= ψE lnh+ υ, (25)
where
υ = ψ ln(
γψ
1 + γnψ
A) + pα lnα+ (1− pα) lnβ.
Thus, average log human capital converges to υ/(1− ψ).
4.3.2 Existence of a Victorian trajectory
We now turn to the marital economy. An important technical step is to
ensure that a marriage market equilibrium exists at all dates. To do so, we
construct a Victorian equilibrium by checking that the inherited distribution
of skills at each date satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3. A convenient
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feature is that the upper and lower bounds of the distribution of human
capital among the alphas and the betas can be computed without know-
ing what this distribution actually is. Since only these bounds intervene in
(16) we know that if it is satisfied then a Victorian equilibrium exists at all
dates provided the initial distribution lies within these bounds. It is then
straightforward to characterize the evolution of the economy’s average hu-
man capital, as well as its genetic composition, and compare it to the state
of nature.
PROPOSITION 9 — Let υ1 = υ + (1− pα) ln αβ . Let
hLRmax,α = exp(
υ1 + ln 2
1− ψ );
hLRmax,β = exp(
υ1 + ln 2− (1− ψ) ln αβ
1− ψ );
hLRmin,β = exp(
υ1 + ln 2− ln αβ
1− ψ ).
Assume that the support of the initial distribution of human capital for al-
pha (resp. beta) people is contained in [hLRmin,β, h
LR
max,α] (resp. [hLRmin,β, h
LR
max,β]).
Assume (16) holds at hmax = hLRmax,β and hmin = h
LR
min,β. Let ρt be the propor-
tion of alpha individuals. Then
(i) There exists a path for the economy where the marriage market equi-
librium is Victorian for both the alphas and the betas at each date.
(ii) Along this path ρt evolves according to
ρt+1 = pβ(1− ρt) + pαρt (26)
(iii) The average log human capital of this economy, defined as E lnht,
evolves according to
E lnht+1 = ψE lnht + υ + ln 2− (1− ρt) [pα − pβ] ln
α
β
(27)
PROOF — See Appendix.
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After having derived the conditions for a Victorian equilibrium to exist
along a dynamic human capital accumulation path, which in some sense
generalizes the results of section 3.3, we now discuss how marriage affects
the economy’s total human capital, which generalizes section ??.
4.3.3 Comparing Steady-State human capital with the State of
Nature
Comparing (27) with (25), it is easy to see that at date t, the society with
marriage has more offspring human capital than the State of Nature iff ln 2−
(1−ρt) [pα − pβ] ln αβ > 0. In steady state, (26) implies that ρ =
pβ
1+pβ−pα . This
equation is then equivalent to
ln 2 > (pα − pβ)
1− pα
1− pα + pβ
ln
α
β
.
This suggests that marriage boosts society’s aggregate human capital if
(i) The alphas are not too different from the betas in terms of the likeli-
hood of getting an alpha offspring, or
(ii) The alphas’s productivity in accumulating human capital is not too
different from the betas’, or
(iii) The proportion of alphas is sufficiently large.30
A more stringent condition is for marriage to increase the human capital
of the betas, relative to a situation where beta women mate with alpha men
and remain single. The average human capital of the betas, denoted by
E lnht,β, evolves according to
E lnht+1,β = ψE lnht,β + υ + ln 2− [pα − pβ] ln
α
β
30The difference between the two long-run levels is then equal to
ln 2− (pα − pβ) 1−pα1−pα+pβ ln
α
β
1− ψ .
It is greater, the higher the proportion of alphas , the weaker the decreasing returns in
the transmission of human capital , the lower the genetic loss from mating with a beta
rather than an alpha
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Relative to the state of nature, beta offsprings get more human capital iff
2 > [pα − pβ] ln
α
β
.
This is equivalent to
ek ≤ 2γnψ. (28)
, i.e. to (24) for h∗ = h. This is clearly more stringent than (16)—in particular,
since ω(., .) > 2γnψ, the assumptions of Proposition 9 always hold if (28)
holds. Therefore, if (28) holds, there exists a Victorian accumulation path
and it improves over the State of Nature in terms of the beta’s average human
capital. But it may be that such a path exists while it reduces the beta’s
average human capital, although it will always increase the alpha’s average
human capital.
5 Summary and conclusion
By bringing fathers into the family, marriage allows to increase parental
investment in children. But, for this to be credibly operationaly, monogamy
must be enforced. As a result, women lose the opportunity of choosing more
attractive mates.
Most of the results derive from this trade-off. Hypergamy arises from the
fact that women must be compensated for the utility loss associated with
the foregone mating opportunities. Assortative mating arises even though
there are no complementarities between the skills of the two members of the
couple, due to the public good aspect of children’s human capital, which
generates increasing returns to skills in the household.
The institution of marriage reduces the genetic quality of offspring, with
that reduction being compensated by greater parental investment. As a re-
sult, a marital society does not necessarily imply greater human capital than
the State of nature. As in Saint-Paul (2007), this is an example of institutions
increasing the frequency of less fit genes as they provide alternative means of
achieving fitness. But this result would be overturned if one holds the view
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that the mates with the best genes are not more productive but only more
sexually attractive, in which case the marital society unambiguously achieves
greater human capital.
Another key result is that inequality in skills in some sense intensifies
competition in marriage markets and leads to "Sex and the City" equilibria
where a pool of single women arises at the top, while a corresponding pool
of single men emerges at the bottom of the distribution.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose it’s not. Then we can find two married couples, (h0, h∗1) and (h1, h∗0),
such that h0 < h1 and h∗0 = h∗(h1) > h∗1 = h∗(h0). Let θ0 = θ(h0) and θ1 =
θ(h1). For this assignment to be an equilibrium, condition (iv) in Proposition
2 must hold. Let us apply it for h∗ = h∗1 and h = h1. Using (7) we see that
ln θˆ(h1, h∗1) = ln θ1 − (1 + γnψ)(ln(h1 + h∗1)− ln(h1 + h∗0)). (29)
Using (8) and (??), we see that we must have
ln(1− θˆ(h1, h∗1)) ≤ ln(1− θ0) + (1 + γnψ)(ln(h∗1 + h0)− ln(h∗1 + h1)).
Substituting (29) we get that the following inequality must hold:
(h1 + h∗1)
1+γnψ ≤ (1− θ0)(h∗1 + h0)1+γnψ + θ1(h1 + h∗0)1+γnψ
If we now apply condition (iv) to h∗ = h∗0 and h = h0, we get a similar
condition
(h0 + h∗0)
1+γnψ ≤ (1− θ1)(h1 + h∗0)1+γnψ + θ0(h∗1 + h0)1+γnψ.
Adding these two inequalities, we get that the following must hold
(h1 + h∗1)
1+γnψ + (h0 + h∗0)
1+γnψ ≤ (h1 + h∗0)1+γnψ + (h∗1 + h0)1+γnψ. (30)
However, the strict convexity of the function ψ(x) = x1+γnψ precludes it.
Let μ = h1−h0h1−h0+h∗1−h∗0 ∈ [0, 1]. One has h1+h
∗
0 = μ(h1+h∗1)+(1−μ)(h0+h∗0),
and h∗1 + h0 = (1 − μ)(h1 + h∗1) + μ(h0 + h∗0). Therefore, ψ(h∗1 + h0) <
(1−μ)ψ(h1+h∗1)+μψ(h0+h∗0) and ψ(h1+h∗0) < μψ(h1+h∗1)+(1−μ)ψ(h0+h∗0).
Adding these two inequalities, we clearly contradict (30). QED
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The first step is to show that if a man is married, all men with greater
human capital must also be married. To see this, consider a single man
with human capital h∗0, married with a woman with human capital h0. Let
θ0 = θ(h0) her corresponding equilibrium output share. A man with human
capital h∗2 > h∗0 can marry her if he gives her a share θˆ(h0, h∗2) such that
Uβ(h0, h∗2, θˆ(h0, h∗2)) = V (h0) = Uβ(h0, h∗0, θ0), or equivalently, using (7),
ln θˆ(h0, h∗2) = ln θ0 + (1 + γnψ) [ln(h0 + h
∗
0)− ln(h0 + h∗2)] . (31)
If h∗2 is single, then he must not be better-off by marrying h0 and offering
her an output share equal to θˆ(h0, h∗2); otherwise, (14) would be violated.
Therefore, we must have U∗β(h0, h
∗
2, θˆ(h0, h∗2)) ≤ V (h∗2) = U¯∗β(h∗2), or equiva-
lently, using (8) and (1),
ln(1− θˆ(h0, h∗2)) ≤ γnψ lnh1 + lnh∗2 − (1 + γnψ) ln(h0 + h∗2). (32)
Substituting (31) into (32), we see that the following inequality must
hold:
(h0 + h∗2)
1+γnψ − θ0(h0 + h∗0)1+γnψ ≤ h
γnψ
1 h
∗
2. (33)
At the same time, h∗0 must be better-off married with h0 than single,
otherwise (13) would be violated. Using (8) and (1), this is equivalent to
(h0 + h∗0)
1+γnψ − θ0(h0 + h∗0)1+γnψ ≥ h
γnψ
1 h
∗
0. (34)
Putting together (34) and (33), we see that the following inequality must
hold:
(h0 + h∗0)
1+γnψ − hγnψ1 h∗0 ≥ (h0 + h∗2)1+γnψ − h
γnψ
1 h
∗
2. (35)
But, since hmin > h1, the expression (h0 + x)1+γnψ − hγnψ1 x is strictly
increasing in x, and therefore (35) cannot hold for h∗2 > h∗0. Therefore, h∗2
must be married too. Consequently, it must be that S∗ = [h∗, hmax].
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Next, we show that the inverse assignment function h∗−1() must be con-
tinuous over S∗. Suppose it is not the case. Since it is monotonic, the set
of its discontinuity points is at most countable. Then there exists some
h∗0 ∈ S˚ such that h2 = limh∗→h∗+0 h
∗−1() > h∗−1(h∗0) = h0.31 Then, all
women in (h0, h2) must be single. Furthermore, a man with human capi-
tal h∗0 must be indifferent between marrying a woman with human capital h0
or a woman with human capital (arbitarily close to) h2. Denoting θ0 = θ(h0)
and θ2 = limh→h+2 θ(h), this can be written as
ln(1− θ2)+ (1+ γnψ) ln(h∗0+h2) = ln(1− θ0)+ (1+ γnψ) ln(h∗0+h0). (36)
Another equilibrium condition is that all women such that h ∈ (h0, h2)
could not be better-off if they married h∗0. The woman’s output share that
would leave him indifferent between marrying h0 or h2 and marrying h is
θˆ
∗
(h, h∗0) such that
ln(1−θˆ∗(h, h∗0)) = (1+γnψ) ln(h∗0+h0)+ln(1−θ0)−(1+γnψ) ln(h∗0+h). (37)
That a woman with h ∈ (h0, h2) prefers to be single than marrying h∗0
under these terms can be written as
k + (1 + γnψ) lnh ≥ ln θˆ∗(h, h∗0) + (1 + γnψ) ln(h∗0 + h). (38)
Note that θˆ
∗
(h0, h∗0) = θ0 and θˆ
∗
(h2, h∗0) = θ2. Taking limits in (38) for
h → h0 and h → h2 and noting that a woman with h = h0 or h arbitrarily
close to h2 is married in equilibrium and thus not worse-off than single, we
see that (38) must hold with equality at the bounds of (h0, h2), i.e.
k + (1 + γnψ) lnh0 = ln θ0 + (1 + γnψ) ln(h∗0 + h0); (39)
k + (1 + γnψ) lnh2 = ln θ2 + (1 + γnψ) ln(h∗0 + h2). (40)
31Here we assume the discontinuity takes place on the right of h∗0. Nothing would change
in the argument if it were on the left.
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Using (39) and (40) to eliminate θ0 and θ2 in (36), we get that
(h∗0 + h2)
1+γnψ − ekh1+γnψ2 = (h∗0 + h0)1+γnψ − ekh
1+γnψ
0 .
Let φ(h) be the function defined by φ(h) = (h∗0 + h)1+γnψ − ekh1+γnψ. It
is easy to see that φ0(h) is positive and then negative as h goes from zero to
infinity. Since φ(h0) = φ(h2), φ() must be hump-shaped between h0 and h2,
implying that
φ(h) > φ(h0) = φ(h2) for h ∈ (h1, h2).
But, substituting (37) into (38), we see that we must also have
(h+ h∗0)
1+γnψ − ekh1+γnψ ≤ (1− θ0)(h∗0 + h0)1+γnψ.
Substituting again the value of θ0 from (39), we see that this is equivalent to
(h+ h∗0)
1+γnψ − ekh1+γnψ = φ(h) ≤ φ(h0) = (h0 + h∗0)1+γnψ − ekh
1+γnψ
0 ,
which is clearly a contradicition. Therefore, the inverse assignment function
must be continuous, implying that S is an interval.
Let h be the lower bound of S. It must be that h∗(h) = h∗. If h∗ =
hmin, then all men are married, so must all women, and one must have S =
[hmin, hmax]. The equilibrium is then Victorian. Assume then that h∗ > hmin.
Assume h > hmin. Then, all women such that h < h are single. We can
use similar steps as the ones used to derive (37)-(40) to show that h is just
indifferent between being married and single, i.e.
k + (1 + γnψ) lnh = ln θ(h) + (1 + γnψ) ln(h∗ + h).
By the same token, h∗ is also indifferent between being married and single,
that is
ln(1− θ(h)) + (1 + γnψ) ln(h∗ + h) = γnψ lnh1 + lnh∗.
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Putting these two conditions together, we see that the marriage viability
condition (9) must be satisfied with equality at h = h and h∗ = h∗. But this
implies that it is satisfied strictly for any h < h and h∗ = h∗. Therefore,
a woman with human capital h < h can underbid h to marry h∗ and give
him a positive surplus, meaning that condition (iii) in Definition 2 must be
violated. Hence, it cannot be that h > hmin, implying that if h∗ > hmin the
equilibrium must be SATC.
Q.E.D.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We construct a function θ(h) to match all three equilibrium conditions. Let
us start with condition (iii). Since all women are married, their reservation
utility is given by
V (h) = ln θ(h) + (1 + γnψ)(lnA+ ln(h+ h∗(h))) + πβ. (41)
By marrying another man with human capital h∗ and get a fraction θ of
consumption, their utility would be given by (7). Therefore, the consumption
share that would make them indifferent between their marriage and this
alternative marriage is given by
ln θˆ(h, h∗) = ln θ(h) + (1 + γnψ)(ln(h+ h∗(h))− ln(h+ h∗)). (42)
The new husband utility is now
U∗β(h, h
∗, θˆ(h, h∗)) = ln (1− θˆ(h, h∗)) + (1 + γnψ)(lnA+ ln(h+ h∗)) + πβ.
It must not exceed the utility he had in his assigned marriage
V ∗(h∗) = ln(1−θ(h∗−1(h∗)))+(1+γnψ)(lnA+ln(h∗−1(h∗)+h∗))+πβ. (43)
Using (42) to eliminate θˆ(h, h∗), and rearranging, we see that the condi-
tion U∗β(h, h
∗, θˆ(h, h∗)) ≤ V ∗(h∗) is equivalent to
(h+h∗)1+γnψ ≤ θ(h)(h+h∗(h))1+γnψ+(1−θ(h∗−1(h∗)))(h∗−1(h∗)+h∗)1+γnψ,
(44)
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and this will hold with equality for h∗ = h∗(h).
In our candidate equilibrium, we have h∗(h) = h. The preceding formula
can simply be rewritten as
(h+ h∗)1+γnψ ≤ θ(h)(2h)1+γnψ + (1− θ(h∗))(2h∗)1+γnψ.
Suppose now that we have θ(h) = 1
2
¡
1 + λh−(1+γnψ)
¢
, this boils down to
(
h+ h∗
2
)1+γnψ ≤ h
1+γnψ + h∗1+γnψ
2
,
which is true by convexity.
Let us now check condition (i), i.e. that women are better-off married
than single. Comparing (41) and (5), we see that the condition V (h) ≥ U¯β(h)
is equivalent to
θ(h) ≥ ek2−(1+γnψ).
If λ ≥ 0 then θ0(h) ≤ 0, so that all women are better-off than being single
provided this inequality holds for h = hmax, that is
λ ≥
¡
ek2−γnψ − 1
¢
h1+γnψmax . (45)
If λ ≤ 0 then θ0(h) > 0 and the condition is satisfied provided the in-
equality holds for h = hmin, that is
λ >
¡
ek2−γnψ − 1
¢
h1+γnψmin . (46)
We see that either ek2−γnψ−1 ≥ 0 and λ cannot be negative, so that (45)
prevails, or ek2−γnψ − 1 < 0 and then all positive values of λ satisfy (45), so
that we only need (46). Putting these things together, we see that the values
of λ which make all women better-off than being single are those such that
λ ≥ max(
¡
ek2−γnψ − 1
¢
h1+γnψmin ,
¡
ek2−γnψ − 1
¢
h1+γnψmax ).
Turning now to condition (ii), using (43) and (1), and the fact that
h∗−1(h∗) = h∗, the condition V ∗(h∗) ≥ U¯∗β(h∗) is equivalent to
1− θ(h∗) ≥ 2−(1+γnψ)hγnψ1 h∗−γnψ. (47)
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If λ ≥ 0 then the LHS goes up with h∗; since the RHS falls with h∗, then
for this to hold for all h∗ it must hold for h∗ = hmin. We get the condition
that
λ ≤
³
1− 2−γnψhγnψ1 h
−γnψ
min
´
h1+γnψmin . (48)
Note that the RHS to this inequality is always positive.
If λ < 0 then the LHS of (47) is always greater than 0.5, and therefore
always exceeds the RHS since h∗ > h1.
Summarizing all these findings, we see that there exist values of λ which
satisfy (i) and (ii) if and only if (16) holds. If (i) and (ii) hold for some λ :
-either ek2−γnψ − 1 < 0; in this case (16) always holds, and we have seen
that all negative values of λ which satisfy (46) and all positive ones which
satisfy (48) are eligible.
-or ek2−γnψ − 1 ≥ 0, in which case the eligible values of λ satisfy both
(45) (implying they are positive) and (48). This set is non empty iff³
1− 2−γnψhγnψ1 h
−γnψ
min
´
h1+γnψmin ≥
¡
ek2−γnψ − 1
¢
h1+γnψmax ,
which is equivalent to (16).
In both cases, the set of eligible values of λ is described by condition (17).
Q.E.D.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
First, we prove that no Victorian equilibrium exists if (16) is violated. In
the proof of Proposition 4, we have seen that for the equilibrium condition
(??) to hold, it must be that (44) holds. We also know that (44) holds with
equality at h∗ = h∗(h). Thus h∗(h) must be a local extremum of the RHS of
(44) minus its LHS, as a function of h∗. Locally, this means that:
(1 + γnψ)(h+ h∗(h))γnψ (49)
= (1− θ(h))(1 + γnψ)(h+ h∗(h))γnψ × ¡1 + h∗0(h)−1¢
−(h+ h∗(h))1+γnψ θ
0(h)
h∗0(h)
.
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In a Victorian equilibrium h∗(h) = h, and this simplifies to
θ0(h) =
1 + γnψ
2h
(1− 2θ(h)).
The solution to this differential equation is the one used in Prop. 3:
θ(h) = 1
2
¡
1 + λh−(1+γnψ)
¢
. Using the same steps as in the proof of Prop. 3,
it is easy to see that for (i) and (ii) to hold in Definition 2, it must be that the
integration constant λ satisfies (17). But no such λ exists if (16) is violated.
Thus, a Victorian equilibrium cannot exist. Q.E.D.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
A. Constructing the assignment for the SATC equilibrium
We now show that an SATC equilibrium can be constructed. For this,
we look for a pair (h∗, h¯) such that h∗ > hmin, h¯ < hmax, and the assignment
given by
h∗(h) = F−1(F (h) + F (h∗)) (50)
is an equilibrium one. Clearly, given h¯, if we choose
h∗ = F−1(1− F (h¯)) = h∗(hˆ), (51)
the candidate assignment will map S = [hmin, h¯] to S∗ = [h∗, hmax] and satisfy
(11). Therefore, it is indeed an assignment:
• We have proved that given any h¯, the value of h∗ given by (51) and the
h∗() function defined by (50) are an assignment.
B. Checking that married people cannot underbid one another
Next, let us assume that the sharing function θ(h) satisfies (20). We show
that (iii) in Definition 2 holds for h ∈ S and h∗ ∈ S∗. As shown in the proof
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of Proposition 4, this is equivalent to (44). Substituting (20), we get that
this is equivalent to
(h+ h∗)1+γnψ ≤ (h∗−1(h∗) + h∗)1+γnψ + (1 + γnψ)
Z h
h∗−1(h∗)
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz,
(52)
for all h, h∗ ∈ S×S∗. Again, equality holds for h∗ = h∗(h). Furthermore, the
derivative of the RHS of (52) with respect to h∗ is (1+γnψ)(h∗−1(h∗)+h∗)γnψ,
while the derivative of the LHS is (1 + γnψ)(h + h∗)γnψ. Given that h∗(h)
is increasing, the former is clearly larger than the latter for h∗ > h∗(h), and
smaller for h∗ < h∗(h). Consequently, the difference between the RHS and
the LHS reaches it minimum at h∗ = h∗(h); hence (52) holds.
• We have proved that if θ(h) satisfies (20), then condition (iii) holds for
(h, h∗) ∈ S × S∗.
C. Deriving the value-matching conditions at the frontier of S and S∗
Next, we show that there exist values for μ, h¯ and h∗ such that, in addition
to (51), the two following conditions hold:
U¯α(h¯) = Uβ(h¯, hmax, θ(h¯)); (53)
U¯∗β(h
∗) = U∗β(hmin, h
∗, θ(hmin). (54)
These two conditions mean that the reservation utilities V () and V ∗() do
not jump as one crosses the boundaries of S and S∗. Otherwise, the equilib-
rium conditions would be violated. Suppose, for example, that a woman such
that h is marginally higher than h¯ has a utility higher than Uβ(h¯, hmax, θ(h¯))
by a discrete amount. Then, since the θ() function is continuous over S,
women with h below h¯ but arbitrarily close to it would be better-off being
single, and condition (i) in Definition 2 would be violated. Suppose now
that a woman with h marginally higher than h¯ has a utility lower than
Uβ(h¯, hmax, θ(h¯)) by a discrete amount. Then θˆ(h, hmax) < θ(h¯) : since these
women are arbitrarily close to h¯, but have a discretely lower utility than the
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married women with h¯, they can reach that same utility by marrying a man
with hmax and get a lower fraction of the surplus. But the hmax man would
then be better-off and this would violate condition (iii). Therefore, (53) must
hold. A similar reasoning applies to (54). Using (4) and (7), we see that (53)
is equivalent to
ln θ(h¯) = k + (1 + γnψ) ln h¯− (1 + γnψ) ln(h¯+ hmax).
Substituting (20), we see that this is equivalent to
μ = ekh¯1+γnψ − (1 + γnψ)
Z h¯
hmin
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz = μH(h¯) (55)
Similarly, we can substitute (1) and (8) into (54) and get
ln(1− θ(hmin)) = −γnψ lnA− πβ + lnh∗ − (1 + γnψ) ln(hmin + h∗),
or equivalently, given (20),
μ = (hmin + h∗)1+γnψ − hγnψ1 h∗ = μL(h¯) (56)
Equations (55) and (56) define a 2x2 system in h¯ and μ, where h∗ is
implicitly treated as a function of h¯ defined by (51).
• We have proved that μ and h¯ must satisfy (55) and (56) in equilibrium.
D. Showing that there is a solution, for μ, h¯, h∗ which satisfies the value-
matching conditions as well as condition (iii) in Definition 2 for singles
To prove that it has a solution, we use the intermediate value theorem.
First, we show that μH(hmax) > μL(hmax). In such a case, one has h∗(h) = h.
Therefore, μH(hmax) = ekh1+γnψmax − 2γnψ
³
h1+γnψmax − h
1+γnψ
min
´
, and μL(hmax) =
21+γnψh1+γnψmin −h
γnψ
1 hmin.Clearly, the condition ekh1+γnψmax −2γnψ
³
h1+γnψmax − h
1+γnψ
min
´
>
21+γnψh1+γnψmin − h
γnψ
1 hmin is equivalent to (16) being violated, which is true
by assumption.
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Next, let hˆ be the minimum possible value of h¯ such that condition (iii)
in definition 2 holds for h > h¯ and h∗ < h∗. The threshold hˆ is such that a
marriage between the least skilled single woman and the most skilled single
man is barely viable, i.e.
(hˆ+ h∗(hˆ))1+γnψ = hγnψ1 h
∗(hˆ) + ekhˆ1+γnψ. (57)
Since (51) implies that h∗0() < 0, while (57) states that (h∗(hˆ), hˆ) lies on
the upward sloping marriage viability frontier, there exists a unique hˆ that
satisfies (57). Furthermore, since (15) holds, this pair must satisfy h∗ < h¯.
We show that μH(hˆ) < μL(hˆ). Substituting (57) into (55), we see that
this is equivalent to
(hˆ+ h∗(hˆ))1+γnψ − (1 + γnψ)
Z hˆ
hmin
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz < (hmin + h∗(hˆ))1+γnψ.
This inequality always holds.32 Thus, by the intermediate value theorem,
there exists a solution to (55)-(56) such that hˆ < h¯ < hmax.
• We have proved that there exists a pair (μ, h¯) such that (55)-(56) hold
and that condition (iii) in Definition 2 holds for (h, h∗) ∈ [hmin, hmax]−
S × [hmin, hmax]− S∗.
E. Checking that the constructed solution satisfies (iii) for a single woman
and a married man
Another requirement is that condition (iii) hold for h > h¯ and h∗ ∈ S∗.
Using (4) and (7), we must have
ln θˆ(h, h∗) = (1 + γnψ)(lnh− ln(h+ h∗)) + k. (58)
Using (8), we see that (14) is equivalent to
32Denoting the LHS by φ(hˆ, h∗(hˆ)), and its RHS by R, it can be checked that
φ(hmin, h∗(hˆ)) = R and that φ01 < 0.
58
ln(1− θˆ(h, h∗)) + (1 + γnψ)(lnA+ ln(h+ h∗)) + πβ
≤ V ∗(h∗)
= ln(1− θ(h∗−1(h∗))) + (1 + γnψ)(lnA+ ln(h∗ + h∗−1(h∗))) + πβ.(59)
Substituting (58) and (20), we see that this is equivalent to
μ ≤ (h∗ + h∗−1(h∗))1+γnψ − (1 + γnψ)
Z h∗−1(h∗)
hmin
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz (60)
+ekh1+γnψ − (h+ h∗)1+γnψ
= φ(h, h∗).
Since (55) holds by construction, we have that φ(h¯, hmax) = μ. Furthermore,
∂φ
∂h
= (1 + γnψ)
£
ekhγnψ − (h+ h∗)γnψ
¤
.
Therefore, ∂φ∂h ≥ 0 if and only if ek ≥ (1 +
h∗
h )
γnψ.
Let us assume that
ek ≥ (1 + hmax
h¯
)γnψ (61)
. It must then be that ek ≥ (1 + h∗h )γnψ for all h∗ ∈ S∗ and for all h ≥ h¯.
Consequently, φ(h, h∗) ≥ φ(h¯, h∗). But we must have φ(h¯, h∗) ≥ μ: Since
h¯ ∈ S, (14) is equivalent to (44) for (h¯, h∗), and we already know that (44)
holds. Therefore, φ(h, h∗) ≥ μ. Hence, condition (61) is sufficient for (iii)
to hold for h∗ ∈ S∗ and h > h¯. Furthermore, if condition (16) holds with
equality, we have that ek > 2γnψ,and in this limit case the solution to (55)-
(56) is h¯ = hmax. (61) then strictly holds. By continuity, if hmax is such that
(16) is not violated by too much, i.e. B in (18) is not too large, then (61)
will hold.
• We have proved that we can choose B such that the values of μ and h¯
constructed in D are such that condition (iii) in Definition 2 holds for
(h, h∗) ∈ [hmin, hmax]− S × S∗.
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F. Checking that the constructed solution satisfies (i)
The condition that married women are better-off than if they were single
can be written
ln θ(h) + (1 + γnψ) ln(h+ h∗(h)) ≥ (1 + γnψ) lnh+ k, ∀h ≤ h∗ (62)
or equivalently using the formula for θ(h) :
μ ≥ ekh1+γnψ − (1 + γnψ)
Z h
hmin
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz = φ(h) (63)
Again, (55) implies that it holds with equality at h = h¯. Furthermore,
φ0(h) = (1+ γnψ)(ekhγnψ− (h+h∗(h))γnψ).We have φ0(h) > 0 if and only if
h∗(h)/h < e
k
γnψ −1. This is again true in the limit case where (16) holds with
equality, since we then have h∗(h) = h and e
k
γnψ > 2. Therefore, in this limit
equilibrium we have φ(h) < φ(h¯). By continuity, this remains true if (15) is
not violated by too much. Then (63) holds, and condition (i) in Definition 2
is satisfied.
• We have proved that we can choose B such that, in addition to the
properties spelled out above, condition (i) in Definition 2 holds.
G. Checking that the constructed solution satisfies (iii) for a single man
and a married woman
We now prove that (iii) holds when h∗ < h∗. Here it is more convenient
to use the alternative formulation defined in footnote 21. Using (1) and (8)
allows us to compute θˆ
∗
(h, h∗) :
θˆ
∗
(h, h∗) = 1− h
γnψ
1 h∗
(h+ h∗)1+γnψ
. (64)
Comparing (7) for θ = θˆ
∗
(h, h∗) and for θ = θ(h) and h∗(h) instead of h∗,
, we see that the condition in footonote 21 holds if and only if
θˆ
∗
(h, h∗) ≤ θ(h)(h+ h
∗(h))1+γnψ
(h+ h∗)1+γnψ
.
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Substituting (20) and (64) we get the following condition
(h+ h∗)1+γnψ − hγnψ1 h∗ ≤ μ+ (1 + γnψ)
Z h
hmin
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz. (65)
Note that this holds with equality for h = hmin and h∗ = h∗, by virtue
of (56). Next, note that the LHS is an increasing function of h∗. Therefore,
(65) holds for all h∗ < h∗ if and only if it holds for h∗ = h∗. Next, note that
the derivative of the RHS with respect to h is (1+γnψ)(h+h∗(h))γnψ, while
the derivative of the LHS at h∗ = h∗ is (1 + γnψ)(h + h∗)γnψ. The former
is clearly larger than the latter since h∗(h) ≥ h∗. Therefore, the difference
between the RHS of (65) and its LHS at h∗ = h∗ is an increasing function
of h. Since (65) holds with equality for h = hmin and h∗ = h∗, it also holds
for any h ≥ hmin and h∗ = h∗. As we have already seen, that in turn implies
that it holds for any h ≥ hmin and h∗ < h∗. This completes the proof that
(iii) holds for single men underbidders.
• We have proved that the values of μ and h¯ constructed in D are such
that condition (iii) in Definition 2 holds for (h, h∗) ∈ S× [hmin, hmax]−
S∗.
H. Proof that (ii) holds for the constructed solution
The last thing we have to check is that (ii) holds, that is, married men
are better-off than if they were single. Denoting by h the wife of a married
man and by h∗(h) this man, we see that this is equivalent to
lnA+ lnh∗(h) ≤ ln(1− θ(h)) + (1 + γnψ) (lnA+ ln(h+ h∗(h))) + πβ.
Substituting in (20), we see that this is equivalent to
μ ≤ (h+ h∗(h))1+γnψ − hγnψ1 h∗(h)− (1 + γnψ)
Z h
hmin
(z + h∗(z))γnψdz. (66)
Again, this holds with equality for h = hmin, because of (56). Further-
more, the RHS’s derivative with respect to h is equal to h∗0(h)
h
(1 + γnψ)(h+ h∗(h))γnψ − hγnψ1
i
,
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which is clearly positive since h∗() is increasing and h+ h∗(h) > h1. There-
fore, the RHS of (66) is an increasing function of h and is always greater for
h > hmin than for h = hmin, where it holds with equality. Hence (66) always
holds:
• We have proved that the values of μ and h¯ constructed in D are such
that condition (ii) in Definition 2 holds.
This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Q.E.D.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The discussion in D. in the proof of proposition 5 implies that we can always
pick an equilibrium such that locally, the RHS of (55) as a function of h∗ is
flatter than that of (56). It is then clear that a rise in k shifs the RHS of (55)
up, and has no effect on (56). Therefore, both h∗ and μ go up, which proves
claim (i). Similarly, a greater h1 reduces the RHS of (56), with no effect on
(55), so that h∗ goes up again while μ falls. This proves claim (ii).
Finally, note that hmax does not enter in (56) and that for a uniform
distribution, (55) is equivalent to
μ = ek(hmax−δ)1+γnψ−2γnψ
£
(hmax − δ/2)1+γnψ − (hmin + δ/2)1+γnψ
¤
, (67)
where δ = h∗−hmin, and h∗(h) = h+ δ. The constructed equilibrium is such
that (61) holds. This also implies that the RHS of (67) is increasing in hmax,
holding h∗ or equivalently δ constant. Consequently, a greater hmax raises
the RHS of (55), so that the equilibrium values of μ and h∗ go up. The
proportion of married people is 1− δhmax−hmin , and it must go down. It falls
iff dδdhmax >
δ
hmax−hmin , which is true if δ is small enough, which is true in the
constructed equilibrium of Prop. 5.
Q.E.D.
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6.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose we are at an optimum. Then output cannot increase by swapping
two members between two couples. Consider two married women with human
capital levels h0 and h2 such that h0 < h2. Then the contribution of these
couples to output is proportional two (h0 + h∗(h0))ψ + (h2 + h∗(h2))ψ. If
they were to swap, their contribution to output would be proportional to
(h0 + h∗(h2))ψ + (h2 + h∗(h0))ψ. Therefore, it must be that
(h0 + h∗(h2))ψ + (h2 + h∗(h0))ψ ≤ (h0 + h∗(h0))ψ + (h2 + h∗(h2))ψ,
or equivalently
(h0 + h∗(h2))ψ − (h0 + h∗(h0))ψ ≤ (h2 + h∗(h2))ψ − (h2 + h∗(h0))ψ. (68)
Let g(x) = (x+a)ψ−(x+b)ψ.We have g0(x) = ψ
£
(x+ a)ψ−1 − (x+ b)ψ−1
¤
.
Clearly, since ψ < 1, g0(x) > 0 iff a < b and g0(x) < 0 iff a > b. Consequently,
since h2 > h0, for (68) to hold we must have h∗(h2) < h∗(h0). Therefore, the
h∗() function must be decreasing. This proves claim (iii).
Consider now a single woman with human capital h2 and a married one
with human capital h0. Their contribution to output is proportional to
(pβα+ (1− pβ)β)(h0 + h∗(h0))ψ + (pαα+ (1− pα)β)hψ2 .
If they were to swap, their contribution to output would be equal to
(pβα+ (1− pβ)β)(h2 + h∗(h0))ψ + (pαα+ (1− pα)β)hψ0 .
The latter must not exceed the former, so that we need to have
g(h2) ≤ g(h0),
with g() now defined as g(x) = (pβα+(1− pβ)β)(x+h∗(h0))ψ− (pαα+(1−
pα)β)xψ.
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Given that ψ < 1, α > β, and pα > pβ, it is clear that g0() < 0. Therefore,
we must have h2 ≥ h0.
Finally, it is obvious that if a single beta man is richer than a married
beta man, a swap between the two will increase total output.
Q.E.D.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Proposition 6 implies that the solution must be such that women are married
for h < h¯ and single for h > h¯, and that men are married for h∗ > h∗ and
single for h∗ < h∗. Furthermore, the only decreasing assignment function
which matches the availability constraint is clearly h∗(h) = η(h). From there,
it is straightforward that the optimum maximizes
max
h¯
Z h¯
hmin
(pβα+(1−pβ)β)(h+h∗(h))ψf(h)dh+
Z hmax
h¯
(pαα+(1−pα)β)hψf(h)dh.
The derivative with respect to h¯ has the same sign as (h¯+h∗(h¯))ψ−κh¯ψ,
which we denote by g(h¯). This quantity is decreasing with h¯ because ψ <
1, κ > 1 and h∗0() < 0. Therefore, if g(hmax) > 0, g(h¯) > 0 throughout and
the optimum is h¯ = hmax. This is case (i) in Proposition 8. The two other
cases correspond to g(hmin) > 0 > g(hmax) and g(hmin) < 0.
Q.E.D.
6.9 Proof of Proposition 9
First, note that a Victorian equilibrium among the alphas always exists. This
is because the apha’s marriage problem is idential to the beta’s except that
k = 0 in this case: women marrying an alpha would access the same genetic
material if they were single instead. Since Proposition 4 holds for k = 0,
such an equilibrium exists.
Next, assume that at date t, all alpha agents have a human capital level
lower than hLRmax,α = exp(
υ1+ln 2
1−ψ ), and all beta agents have a human capital
lower than hLRmax,β = exp(
υ1+ln 2−(1−ψ) ln αβ
1−ψ ).
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Clearly, for generation t+ 1, the human capital level of an alpha cannot
exceed that of the alpha children of a couple such that the man is alpha and
has human capital hLRmax,α. This can be written as:
h ≤ ln 2 + υ1 + ψ lnhLRmax,α.
By construction, the RHS is equal to hLRmax,α. Therefore, all the alphas in
generation t+1 have a human capital which cannot exceed hLRmax,α. As for the
betas of that generation, they cannot do better than the beta children of an
alpha couple with human capital hLRmax,α :
h ≤ ln 2 + υ1 + ψ lnhLRmax,α − ln(
α
β
) = hLRmax,β < h
LR
max,α.
Therefore, the property that h < hLRmax,β for all the betas and h < h
LR
max,α
for all the alphas will remain true across all generations, regardless of how
the betas mate.
Assume that at date t, all agents have a human capital level larger than
hLRmin,β = exp(
υ1+ln 2−ln αβ
1−ψ ). In condition (16), ω(hmin, hmax) is an increasing
function of hmin and a decreasing function of hmax. By assumption, (16) holds
for hmin = hLRmin,β and hmax = h
LR
max,β. By assumption, the distribution of
the beta’s human capital at t is such that hLRmin,β ≤ hmin,t ≤ hmax,t ≤ hLRmax,β.
Therefore, (16) holds. Hence, there exists a marriage market equilibrium at t
which is Victorian for the betas. Furthermore, in generation t+1, the lowest
human capital level of a beta cannot exceed that of a beta offspring of a beta
couple with human capital hLRmin,β :
h ≥ ln 2 + υ1 + ψ lnhLRmin,β − ln(
α
β
) = hLRmin,β.
Therefore, the property that h > hLRmin,β still holds among the betas (and,
a fortiori, among the alphas33) of generation t+1, implying that a Victorian
equilibrium also exists for them. By induction, h > hLRmin,β for all generations
33The alphas will, from date t = 1 on, have a human capital strictly above hLRmin,α =
exp(
υ1+ln 2−ψ ln αβ
1−ψ ) > h
LR
min,β
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and a Victorian equilibrium exists at all dates. This proves claim (i) in
Proposition 9.
Claim (ii) derives straightforwardly from the fact that all agents marry,
so that a fraction ρt of children have alpha fathers.
Claim (iii) derives straightforwardly from aggregating log human capital
among all offsprings of types alpha and beta.
Q.E.D.
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hFigure 1 – The marriage frontier
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hFigure 2 – The child improvement frontier
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κFigure 3 – The output maximizing matching pattern
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